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Abstract
Decomposing economic time series into their
temporary and permanent components have followed
two broad paths: trend versus difference stationary
models and detrending versus filtering. Whereas the
former breaks down due to their inability to capture
the underlying data generation process (dgp), the
latter are either one sided filters or are based on ad
hoc procedures in achieving parsimony. In this paper,
we propose structural time series models in which
trends, cycles, seasonal components are treated as
stochastic, and which contains the traditional
approach as a special case. Cast in state space form,
and estimated using maximum likelihood via the
Kalman filter, these models accurately predict the
behaviour of commodity prices through time. Using
data on agricultural raw materials and metal price
indices for the 1957(1) to 2008(4) period we
document the frequency and duration of commodity
prices, key elements for designing policies aimed at
smoothing terms of trade shocks and the resulting
macroeconomic effects associated with price
disruptions. We found that the individual dgp have
varied over time and are best captured as stochastic
rather than deterministic trends. Moreover, we
uncover multiple structural breaks and outliers, far
beyond what extant results would like us to believe.
Finally, the models remain robust in an out of sample
forecast.
Key Words: commodity prices, terms of trade
shocks, trends, cycles and state space models.
JEL classification: C51, Q11, E32 
Introduction
All primary commodities exhibit certain stylized facts: they
have grown above average over the past 60 years, and
have fallen much less so during the same period; slowing
more with recessions, and rising faster with upturns. The
short-run fluctuations in primary commodity prices are
noted to be demand driven, and sometimes display
evidence of lagged supply response, while the long-run
trend is supply driven and tend to follow advances in
technology in primary, relative to manufactured industries
(see Cashin and McDermott, 2002; Deaton and Laroque,
1992). Whereas a lot has been written about the
behaviour of commodity markets, there are still many
gaps in our knowledge concerning the short-run cyclical
fluctuations and long-term trends.
Extant knowledge have followed two broad paths:
trend and difference stationary models and their various
extensions that account for structural breaks and,
detrending procedures based on Beveridge and Nelson
(1981), type decomposition and Hodrick and Prescott
(1980), for short, style of detrending. While the former
suffer from low power, imposes a restrictive deterministic
time trend plus a stationary component which is
sometimes misleading and indeed unnecessary (see
Harvey, 1997), the latter, notably, techniques are based on
ad hoc procedures in their model selection, while the
Hodrick and Prescott filters employ mechanical means to
separate the long-run from the short term components. In
this paper, we propose unobserved components to
overcome the intractable difficulties encountered in extant
literature.
First, estimating the change in the secular terms of
trade inevitably faces serious statistical difficulties. For
example, results are very sensitive to which years are
taken as the beginning and end of the data series and the
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way the price indices of exports and imports are
calculated. We favour this model based as opposed to
the model free procedures found in the literature as they
capture the salient features of the data that are useful in
analysing and predicting the short run and long run
behaviour of commodity terms of trade. Moreover, it is
easy to incorporate changing patterns and to introduce
additional features such as interventions.
Second, in contrast with previous studies that rely on
cross-country evidence, we concentrate on individual
commodity prices. With cross-country studies, a
movement in the commodity prices, and hence the overall
terms of trade of all developing countries does not have
much relevance for individual countries in the context of
policy prescriptions. For example, a developing country
exporting mainly beverages would have found its terms of
trade rising very little between 1972 and 2001, while
developing countries exporting primarily raw materials,
metals and especially petroleum experienced a large
increase in their terms of trade. Thus, what is important is
the type of product in a nations exports and the change in
the price of those products over time. We account for this
by focusing on specific commodity indices for which
movements in global demand and supply conditions
would have implications for the terms of trade of
exporting nations. Our results indicate that nearly all
recessions since the 1960s have been preceded by some
kind of commodity price shock. Metal prices tend to track
the economic cycle while agricultural raw materials
fluctuate anywhere from every 2.5 to 8 years. These
fluctuations are persistent in both boom and burst phases
and can lessen as well as exacerbate recessions.
Section 2 outlines the structural time series models
applied in decomposing our set of commodity prices. 
Section 3 briefly reviews the trends in primary
commodity prices. We decompose the cycles in section 4
and discuss policies aimed at smoothing short run
shocks to commodity terms of trade for exporting
countries. 
Section 5 discusses interventions beyond the short
run.
Model set up: unobserved
components
We propose structural time series models that typically
consist of interpretable components such as trend, cycle,
seasonal and irregular components. Each component is
set up in such a way that the dynamic stochastic process
depends on normally distributed disturbances. With
regards to the terms of trade series, this seems to be the
most plausible way of decomposing trends and cycles as
opposed to the alternative analysis based on Hodrick-
Prescott filter and Beveridge-Nelson decomposition. The
deterministic trend is a limiting case in which the
hyperparameters which allow the level and slope to
change are equal to zero. This allows us to investigate the
long-run and shortrun dynamics of commodity prices,
while modelling the observed and unobserved
components associated with them. Following Harvey
(1989), Harvey and Koopman (2000), the logarithm of the
terms of trade index x can be represented with stochastic
unobservable components as follows
χt = μt + ψt + εt t = 1, ..., Τ (1)
where μt is a trend component, ψt is a cycle component
and εt is an irregular component. We assume that the ψt
is a stationary white noise process, εt is a white noise
disturbance with variance σ2 and the components are
mutually uncorrelated. The linear trend can be written as
μt = μt-1 + βt-1 + ηt t = 1, ..., Τ (2)
βt = βt-1 + ζ t = 1, ..., Τ (3)
Where ηt and ζt are independent white noise processes
with variances σ2ηand σ2ζrespectively. The cyclical
component can be modelled as 
[ψt] = ρ [cosλ sinλ] [ψt-1] + [ωt]…0≤λ≤,0≤ρ≤1 (4)ψt*          -sinλ  sinλ      ψ*t-1       ψ*t
where ωt and ω*tare uncorrelated white noise processes
with variances σ2ωand σ2ω * respectively (ψ*t appears by
construction). Here λ can be thought of as the frequency
of the cycle and ρ as a damping factor of the amplitude.
Although this formulation appears rather peculiar, it 
allows for a great variety of processes. The cycle can 
be written as
(1 - 2ρcosλL + ρ²L²) ψt = (1 - ρcosλL) ωt + (ρsinλL)ω*t (5)
which is an ARMA (2, 1) (L is the lag operator). 
If σω2 = σ2ω * , it reduces to an AR(2) with complex roots,
whereas if either λ = 0 or λ = η, then the cycle is AR(1).
We assume σω2 . = σ2ω *
Equations (1), (2), (4) and (5) can be cast in state space
form. The parameters λ, ρ, σ2ωand σ2η are estimated by
maximizing the likelihood of the observed sample with
respect to these parameters through the Kalman filter. A
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comparison of different non-tested models can be made
either using the maximized likelihood function (L) or the
prediction error variance (PEV), which is the steady-state
variance of the one-step ahead prediction error.
Equations (1), (2), (4) and (5) also imply an ARMA
representation of 
1                         (1 – ρcosλL + ρsinλL) ωtχt =  Δ² (ζt-1 + Δηt) +                                        + εt (6)(1- Φ1L – Φ2L2)
where Δ = (1 – L) is the first difference operator. Equation
(5) shows that a structural time series model can be
thought of as an unobserved component ARMA (2, 2, 4)
with at most two unit roots. Thus, if σ2ζ= 0, i.e the slope is
constant, and σ2η > 0, then ℵt is stationary in first
differences, whereas if σ2ζ = σω2 = σ2 then ℵt is difference
stationary. Conversely, if σ2η = σ2ζ = σω2 = 0, then ℵt is
trend stationary and all the variance is attributed to the
irregular component. Here the trend is linear and
deterministic and has a non-zero constant drift. If σω2 > 0,
ℵt is still trend stationary with richer dynamics (it is an
ARMA(2,2)) and all the variance is attributed to the cyclical
and residual components. The most general model has
stochastic trend, stochastic slope and a stationary ARMA
cycle. Among the restricted versions of the basic
structural model are the deterministic trend model with
constant slope and the stochastic trend model with AR (1)
cycle. In the former restrictions are σ2η = σ2ζ = 0 while in
the latter λ = 0 or λ = π.
What has been happening to
commodity prices?
Prior to the 2007/2008 asset price bubble the world
economy was hit by two shocks: a tsunami of energy and
food price rises. At the end of 2006, the price of crude oil
was about $60/barrel and, about $90/barrel at the end of
2007. It leapt from around $100/barrel and reached an all
time peak of $145/barrel in 2008 before receding with the
recession. Along side the rising energy costs was another
shock, described as the ‘silent tsunami’ by the director
general of the World Food Programme: explosion in world
food prices. A worldwide commodity price boom picked
up pace in 2007, with the IMF commodity price index
indicating a 45% hike since the end of 2006, mirroring
earlier price run-ups in other commodities such as tin,
nickel, soybeans, corn, wheat, and rice. In 2007 wheat
prices rose 77% and, rice 16%. Record prices for fuel
and food gave a vicious twist to inflation, pushing up the
cost of living for workers, cut backs on air travel due to
high surcharges and arguably, are partly to blame for
propelling industrial and emerging economies closer to a
recession even before the explosion in the sub prime
mortgage sector1. Figure 1 shows the plot of the two
commodities analysed: agricultural raw material and
metals. The data set is data is quarterly from 1957(1) to
2008(4). The two indices track important commodities
traded internationally. The components of the agricultural
raw materials index and their respective weights in the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) calculations are;
cotton (1.1%), hides (3.1%), rubber (1.1%), timber (5%)
and wool (1.1%). The metals index has aluminium (6.1%),
copper (5.1%), iron ore (1.8%), lead (0.3%), nickel (1.2%),
tin (0.3%), uranium (0.7%) and zinc (0.9%). 
Figure 1: Logarithms of commodity prices
Agricultural raw materials
Metals
A cursory look at the graphs depicts that booms and
bursts in commodity prices have mimicked upturns and
downturns in the global economy since the 1960s,
indicating that vagaries in real commodity prices either
Ashesi Economics Lectures Series Journal 3 Volume 1, issue 1
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precede or lead recessions. We can infer from the graph
that before 1973 commodity prices have been relatively
stable, with metal prices depicting more variability than
agricultural raw materials. The entry of the cartel OPEC in
the 1970s and the subsequent 1973 oil price shock drove
all commodity prices upward (this is true for all non-fuel
primary commodities after the 1973 oil shock). In a space
of just one year, metal prices went up by 18.6% from
3.5% in 1972 to 4.3% in 1973. Agricultural raw materials
also rose by 20% during the same period. Commodity
prices have continued their upward trend since then,
punctuated by slumps. However, the recession that
followed this boom, sent commodity prices trending
downwards in real terms from the mid 1970s to most of
the 1980s. Metal prices went down by 5.4% in 1975,
25% in the 1980s recession and all time drop of 34.7% in
1993. Agricultural raw materials followed similar patterns
with 19.2% drop in 1975, 12.9% in 1980 and 14% in
1990. The early 1990 recession, coupled with the 2000s
recessions depressed prices until the recent boom from
2004 onwards. The end of the sample in Figure 1 shows
that the rate of growth of metal prices has been faster
than agricultural raw materials, and the price build up that
started in 2004 ended with the 2007/2008 recession.
Importantly, Figure 1 shows that commodity prices begun
to weaken by the end of 2008, even faster for metals. The
slump in global growth from the first quarter of 2008,
subdued demand from industrialized economies and the
lackluster performance of emerging markets, notably
India and China, account for the recent weakness. The
trends of commodity prices is of particular importance
since they capture the permanent component of prices,
and are likely to be driven by production and technology
advances in primary industries, while the cyclical patterns
capture the temporary components, reflecting demand
conditions and/or lagged supply response. Thus from the
point of view of policy when assessing the near-to-
medium term outlook for commodity prices, it is important
to have an idea to what extent the cycles persists, and
how they inform the trend.
These swings in commodity prices calls for a critical
look at the trends and cycles imbedded in real time
movement in commodity prices. Such an exercise is
crucial because more than half the developing world
dwells on the export of some one or two primary
commodities for export earnings. The Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that over 2.5
billion people in the developing world depend on the soil
for their livelihoods. Thus the long-term trends, short-term
shocks and price spikes in commodity markets aren't just
arcane macro-economic phenomena − they have very
real impacts on the day to day lives of people everywhere
i.e. whether they are cotton farmers in Mali, oil workers in
Nigeria or copper miners in Zambia. It equally affects the
price we all pay for food and clothing and manufactured
goods, and most importantly, the global economy as we
see in the current recession
Decomposing the cycles 
A common misunderstood behaviour of commodity
prices is the cyclical fluctuations around the trend. Figure
two plots 3 filtered cycles estimated using state-space
methods for two the two commodities. For metals, the
time span for the first cycle shows periodicity of 9.6
quarters, approximately 2 years. This is similar to the
second cycle for agricultural raw materials, where the
cycle is about 2.5 years. For metals, we document that
the second cycle approximate that of a normal business
cycle, estimated to be about 5 years in length. The third
cycle for both commodities is longer, 7 years for metals
and 8 years for agricultural raw materials. The speed with
which commodity price cycles die are quite persistent,
estimated to average 0.9 for the three cycles in both
commodities. The existence and persistence of these
cycles raises important policy questions about the
stabilization and, consumption and income smoothing of
both producing and consuming nations alike, given that
these short-run fluctuations impact on the
macroeconomic and balance of payments positions of
commodity exporters. A traditional argument to lessen
the effects of the short-run fluctuations is for governments
of raw material nations to intervene.
Figure 2: Cycles in Commodity Prices
Metals
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Agricultural raw materials
This argument is in turn informed by microeconomic
considerations. If private agents bear all the downside risk
of commodity price (and supply is inelastic in the short-
run), they will face variable and unpredictable incomes
streams over time, with possibly very limited opportunity
to smooth income. Thus, it may be optimal for the
government to intervene to stabilize prices received by
private agents and thus enhance the welfare of risk
averse individuals by permitting smoother income and
consumption streams. Implicit in this explanation
however, is the assumption that individual agents are
myopic, and /or they may lack information to form
reasonable expectations about the nature of price
shocks. The evidence to date suggests that this is not
observed in reality. Micro surveys indicate that rice
farmers in Thailand for example smooth their
consumption quite successfully both within and between
harvest years. Evidence from Ghana shows that small
holders are capable of making intertemporary choices
between consumption and savings. This is particularly
evident in the cocoa boom in 2002/2003. Cocoa
producers found that the boom was largely due to the
political problems in Ivory Coast. A lot has also been
written about the Kenyan coffee boom of 1976–79 where
as much as 60% of boom income went into private
savings, simply because farmers were aware that the
boom was due to frost damage in Brazil and that their
income gains were largely transitory. In contrast, the
Kenyan government went on a spending spree following
the coffee boom, far in excess of revenues. Although the
evidence goes contrary to what theory predicts, there is a
big role for governments in commodity price fluctuations,
other than direct interference with the price signals. This
could be achieved through social safety nets measures,
such as government taking stakes in raw material based
industries, so that in return for holding equity in such
concerns may also levy export and income taxes. Export
revenue taxes (whether in the form of specific and ad
valorem taxes and adjustable levies) have been popular
with commodity exporting countries in generating
revenues to stabilize the price disruptions that result from
commodity price fluctuations. The establishment of
marketing boards is yet another measure to smooth the
path of price fluctuations. These boards set producer
prices below international prices with the view to
stabilizing incomes of private agents while the fluctuation
in international commodity prices are transmitted directly
to the budget via export taxes or surpluses generated by
the marketing boards. One difficult problem in these
interventions is the potential backlash they have by
creating all manner of rent seeking behaviour, which in the
long-run defeats the very purpose for which they have
been established. Thus not only does strong institutional
backing and monitoring needed but also a rethink of the
incentive structure that keeps rent seeking behaviour alive
and profitable is required for successful operation.
Raw material based developing countries have also
designed stabilization funds to deal with the impact of the
temporary fluctuations in commodity prices, particularly
managing export receipts to serve as a buffer in stormy
times. The existence of stabilization funds, it is argued,
impose a rule on governments, designed to use
resources more optimally from a long term perspective
and lessen the risk that governments may be tempted to
increase spending excessively during temporary booms.
However, there is no evidence to suggest that a third
world a government facing elections may remain
disciplined with regards to spending. 
Further, their design imposes the same rent seeking
behaviour that boards present. That said, it may be
important that countries time investments in new projects
to take advantage of the cyclical upturns and thus
improve project profitability. Moreover, hedging the
downside risk associated with slumps in commodity
prices that typically occur anywhere between 2 to 7 years
provide a better way out of the boom-burst behaviour of
commodities. This is particularly crucial and more
tractable, given that, knowledge on the timing and
duration of price slumps has improved dramatically. 
Beyond the cyclical fluctuations
In the long-run, policies needed to deal with the
commodity price debacle are different. Our evidence
suggests that the long-run trend of commodities has
Ashesi Economics Lectures Series Journal 5 Volume 1, issue 1
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been characterized by huge shocks and structural
changes, providing a kind of feedback loop, namely that,
whereas the short-run cycles persist and inform the long-
run trend, the structural changes and breaks in the
long-run trend feed into the short-run cycles. Most
developing countries embarked on import substitution in
the 1950s/60s as a way of reallocating resources away
from primary production into heavy industry and
manufactures directed to the local market. For most
African and Latin American countries, the results have
been largely disastrous, partly because investments were
undertaken in industries where the countries did not enjoy
comparative advantage, and/or lacked technical know-
how, but most importantly because the state took centre
stage in the import substitution business thus
undermining the profit motive that innovation and
competition brings to the market place. Attempts have
also been made by developing countries to adopt more
outward oriented trade regimes from the 1980s onwards,
but the terms of engagement here have been skewed
against developing nations, with the same composition of
raw material exports and manufactured imports. For Latin
America and Asia, progress has been made since the
1980s with greater diversification and robust exports in
semi-processed and manufactured exports. Africa’s
performance has lagged far behind other regions in this
respect. The evidence from commodity exporting OECD
countries such as Australia, Norway and Canada
indicates that sound management of export receipts,
robust political and economic institutions, determined
approach to diversification, proper investment in
commodity producing infrastructure and sound corporate
performance are sine qua non to successful raw material
based economies. The suggestion of international
commodity agreements, albeit works well for OPEC, has
not been successful in other commodity classes. Again
the experience of OECD commodity exporters suggests
that such cartels are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for a successful home grown commodity
economy. Looking ahead, commodity exporting
developing countries by requiring a substantial proportion
of the raw materials to be processed domestically for
export. In contrast to the prevailing logic of import
substitution in the earlier decades, such industries should
be driven mainly by economic imperatives rather than
political whims. Private-public, private-private
partnerships may hold an important lesson in this respect,
with state driving infrastructure development and
attending to the institutional bottlenecks that more often
kick against private initiative, while the private sector
concentrate on the wealth creating business. Implicit here
is that the state of technology and capital (most notably
financial capital and machines) is given. The industries
thus established retains the bulk of the employment that
is exported with the commodities and the attendant
outlook for the balance of payments and budget position.
The technology transfer that ensues also transmits to the
local economy. Very recently, Botswana has been
successful in negotiating a contract with DeBeers, the
world’s largest dealer in diamonds to open a processing
factory in Botswana. With 25% of the worlds diamond
coming from this source such a venture, across
commodity exporting countries such as Zambia (copper),
Ghana (cocoa and gold), hold the single most important
promise for dealing with the long term weaknesses
evident in  commodity prices. However, the opening
factories in raw material sources is not enough if sufficient
demand cannot be generated for the products thus
produced. Thus, commodity producing developing
countries endeavour to reduce dependence on external
markets by encouraging local demand. Admittedly, this is
itself a function of incomes, and hence requires robust
economic and sustainable growth to alter the current
dynamics.
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Abstract
Significant ambiguity still surrounds the aid-growth
relationship despite fifty years of research on the
subject. For the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a
possible reason for the lack of consensus is that until
recently the influence of political stability on the aid-
growth relationship had been largely ignored despite
its relevance for the region. Further, although
overlooked by the literature, the Instrumental Variable
(IV) technique, the preferred treatment method of
endogeneity in aid-growth relationships, may be
ineffective in eliminating endogeneity bias because
typical instruments for aid are neither sufficiently
exogenous nor strong. Using a dataset of 31 SSA
countries from 1984-2007, we re-visit the question of
whether aid can spur growth in SSA using first-
differencing (FD) to eliminate unobserved effect
endogeneity while focusing on the role of political
stability on the aid-growth relationship in SSA.
Results suggest aid promotes growth conditional on
political stability in SSA and that First Differencing
(FD) eliminates a substantial amount of the
endogeneity bias. Our results demonstrate the
pertinence of a stable political environment to
attaining the UN’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) for SSA countries since these goals
inherently assume that aid can promote growth.
Key Words: Growth, Aid, Political Stability,
Endogeneity, SSA, and IV.
JEL classification: 011 
Introduction
Despite repeated warnings by economists of its futility, the
developed world still provides lots of aid to Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) to spur economic growth (Leeson, 2008 and
Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010). SSA has absorbed almost
one trillion nominal aid dollars over the last fifty years but
the growth record has been unimpressive (Mayo, 2009
and Easterly, 2006). The insistence of developed
countries to bestow aid on SSA is not so confounding if
one considers that ambiguity still surrounds the effect of
foreign aid on growth (Naito, 2010 and Bruckner, 2011).
In particular, estimation of the aid-growth relationship is
fraught with different kinds of endogeneity problems
(Rajan and Subramanian, 2008 and Deaton, 2008).
Further, since SSA has been racked by political instability,
a question emerges about the effect of political stability on
the aid-growth relationship in the region.
Given the uncertainty about the effect of aid on growth,
and the possible consequences of political stability on the
aid-growth relationship, this paper seeks to: (1) empirically
determine if aid and growth are related using recent SSA
data, and (2) identify the effects of political stability on the
aid-growth relationship in SSA after accounting for
possible endogeneity bias.
The article contributes to the literature in three main
ways. First, it focuses on the SSA region and employs
recent data in estimating the effect of political stability on
the aid-growth relationship. Second, it uses a dependable
measure of political stability constructed with Political Risk
Service (PRS)’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
dataset to identify the effect of political stability on the aid-
growth relationship in SSA. Finally the possibility of
endogeneity bias is addressed: The current literature
treatment of endogeneity with IV is criticized while FD is
justified and employed in estimating the aid-growth
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regression. Aid is found to be positively and significantly
related to growth in SSA conditional on political stability
after minimizing endogeneity bias. This result confirms
Islam’s (2005) finding that aid promotes growth in stable
but not in unstable LDCs. 
Literature review
There are valid theoretical arguments as to why the effect
of aid on growth might be positive, negative, linear,
nonlinear or even ambiguous (Minoiua, and Reddyb,
2010; Easterly, 2006 and Hansen and Tarp, 2001). On
one hand, “Gap theory” contends that aid promotes
growth by augmenting the investment and foreign
exchange needed for production and growth (Chenery
and Strout, 1966). 
On the other hand, countries that receive aid might
consume it, leading to aid-dependence (Bauer, 1984,
1991and 2000; Mayo, 2009; Rajan, and Subramanian,
2011 and Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010). Clearly, aid might
hurt or promote growth, so the effect of aid on growth
remains an empirical question (Rajan and Subramanian,
2008 and Bruckner, 2011). Comprehending the exact
relationship between aid and growth is, however, crucial
to SSA countries and donors as they seek to realize the
UN's MDGs because the MDGs inherently posit that aid is
growth-promoting (see Appendix 1 for details of the eight
MDGs). The stated aim of the MDGs is to halve severe
$1/day poverty between 1990 and 2015 using aid as one
strategy (Sachs, 2005 and Collier, 2007) so it’s vital to
ascertain with a  reasonable degree of confidence how
aid affects growth in SSA.
Entangled in the debate on how aid affects growth are
differences in the structure of the economic model, the
context under which aid is effective, the econometric
procedures employed and the data used. In particular, the
effect of aid on growth is likely to be context-specific
therefore identifying the salient features of the context
received a lot of attention in the literature. Burnside and
Dollar (2000) (henceforth BD (2000)) identified good
macroeconomic policy as the salient contextual condition
for aid to promote growth. They found that the aid-growth
relation is positive for countries that maintain sound
economic policies but negative for countries with
inappropriate policies, basing their result on a positive and
significant interaction term involving aid and policy. BD
(2000) included a dummy for SSA which proved negative
and significant in aid-growth regressions, indicating that
the aid-growth effect may be different for SSA. This point
is noteworthy as effective policy might be insufficient to
guarantee the efficacy of aid in promoting growth in SSA.
Not surprisingly, the contention that aid promotes growth
given good policy has been successfully challenged in the
literature. For example, Easterly, Levine and Roodman
(2004) showed that the positive aid effect given good
policy disappears when either more time series data or
different countries are used in the data set. In contrast,
Islam (2005) finds that the aid-growth relationship must
be conditioned on political stability, not macroeconomic
policy as political stability is the more pertinent
determinant of the efficacy of aid in stimulating growth. 
Like Islam (2005), our objective is to investigate
whether political stability influences the aid-growth
relationship. However, we limit our dataset to SSA
because this is our region of interest and because SSA
appears to experience relatively high levels of instability.
We investigate the effect of political stability on the aid-
growth relationship and address two types of endogeneity
also identified by Hansen and Tarp (2001): (i) simultaneity
(caused by feedback from growth to aid) and (ii)
unobserved effects endogeneity caused by correlation
between latent, time-invariant (and or time-varying)
country-specific effects in the error matrix and the matrix
of right hand side variables. Both types of endogeneity
can cause bias in OLS estimation of aid-growth
relationships so their deleterious effects need to be
properly mitigated. While the aid-growth literature only
now focuses on reducing bias due to unobserved effect
endogeneity, it abounds with attempts to control
simultaneity bias using IV. There is however limited
literature that focuses on evaluating whether the typical
instruments for aid used in IV estimation of aid-growth
regressions such as population satisfy the exogeneity and
strength criteria defined for valid instrumental variables
analysis (Deaton, 2008). This research will help close that
literature gap. For example, population may be
endogenous in the growth equation for SSA countries.
Therefore, in contrast to the IV treatment of the
endogeneity of aid by Islam (2005), Burnside and Dollar
(2000), and majority of the aid literature, typical
instruments for aid may actually be invalid instruments for
aid. Colonial legacy (Islam 2005) and rainfall (Bruckner,
2001), however, may be argued to be exogenous
instruments for aid since they are not determined by
contemporaneous economic performance. However, they
are not excludable; that is, they belong to the true model
and should enter the growth equation as explanatory
variables and should not be used as instruments. Finally,
except for Deaton (2008) the literature has not focused on
evaluating the “strenght” of instrument for aid in aid-
growth regressions.
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Empirical model 
The model used in this paper is a modified version of
Islam’s (2005) empirical aid-growth model which was
derived from Solow’s (1956) theoretical growth model and
is standard in the aid-growth literature. Following Islam
(2005), aid is hypothesized to affect growth through its
effect on savings and investment. Political stability affects
the aid-growth link through its effect on the ability of a
nation’s citizens to accumulate capital, save, invest and
innovate (Hansen and Tarp, 2011). In particular a stable
political environment can lead to effective economic
policies and correct investment decisions both of which
can spur growth. In a stable political environment, aid is
then just new capital and should logically contribute to
growth (Hansen and Tarp, 2001). The effects of political
stability on the aid-growth relationship can thus be
captured in the empirical model by the interaction
between political stability and aid. The empirical growth
model employed is presented in (1)–(3) and used to
investigate the relationship between economic growth
and foreign aid, as well as the effects of political stability
on the aid-growth relationship in SSA. 
(1) GROWTH it = γo + γ AID AID t-1 + γAIDSQ AID2 t-1
+ γAIDPS AIDPS t-1 + γ PS PS t-1 +  γ SQPS PS2 t-1
+ Zit 'γZ + ε it
(2) ε it =   ε i +  ν it
(3) ν it ~   N (0, σ2 )
GROWTH is GDP per capita growth, AID, is foreign aid or
Official Development Assistance (ODA), AID2 is the square
of AID, PS is political stability, PS2 is the square of political
stability, AIDPS is the interactions of PS with AID, and γ0
is the overall constant. The vector Z includes variables
that control for initial conditions affecting growth, and
recent literature provides guidance for their selection
(Islam, 2005). Z contains variables such as initial level of
income (represented by initial GDP or IGDP), standard
deviation of aid (STAID), level of education (PRIM), quality
of institutions (represented by international country risk
guide (ICRG)’s quality of bureaucracy and democratic
accountability variables, BQUAL and DACC), government
consumption as a portion of GDP (GCONS), and the
money supply as proportion of GDP or (M2). Different
from Islam (2005) but consistent with Rajan, and
Subramanian (2011), Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) and
Minoiua and Reddyb (2010), we explicitly specify the
unobserved effects which are likely correlated with the
explanatory variables in the error term. Thus, εit is a
composite error consisting of a country-specific
component, εit and an iid error term, νit which has
variance σ.2 We include a set of time dummies, one for
each four-year period, to account for potential cyclical
effects such as downturns in the world economy that may
affect the aid-growth relationship.
The sign of the relationship between aid and growth
remains an empirical question and may depend on the
countries examined (Easterly, 2003). Political stability is
expected to positively promote growth. While quality of
institutions, level of education and the money supply
variables are expected to be positively related to growth,
government consumption and the standard deviation of
aid are expected to be negatively correlated with growth.
Initial GDP will also likely reduce growth as dictated by
conditional convergence (Barro, 1996). Following Easterly,
Levine, and Dollar (2004) the square of aid is also
included as a regressor in the growth equation to account
for other possible types of non-linearity. 
Data description and summary
statistics
The aid data are from SourceOECD while the political
stability data are from the Political Risk Service (PRS) and
are described in detail later in the paper. Aid as used here
refers to Oversees Development Assistance (ODA)
typically given to poorer countries by richer donors and is
exclusive of non-ODA aid. According to the development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, there are two
main types of ODA aid; multilateral and bilateral aid.
About 30% of ODA aid is multi-lateral aid and the
remaining 70% is bilateral aid. Total ODA is used in this
research. ODA donor countries belong to the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and together donate about 80% of total
worldwide aid. China and India have recently become
significant donors together accounting for more than 10%
of total current aid but such aid is not ODA aid and is not
considered in this research. Private organizations provide
10% of worldwide aid (OECD). 
The growth data and the remainder of the data are
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World
Bank, the Penn World Tables, and the World Banks’
Africa Database CD. The data come from 31 SSA
countries for which data were available, range from 1984
to 2007 and cover six four-year periods (i.e. 1984–1987
to 2004–2007). Apart from possible sample selection bias
that may emerge since not all SSA countries are included
in the dataset, there are also missing observations leading
to an unbalanced panel. 
It is also plausible that countries with worse institutions
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(or more likely to be afflicted by war) are less likely to have
good quality data so they are not part of the sample.
Such countries are perhaps also more likely to have a
zero aid-growth relationship; so their absence would bias
OLS results upward. Note, however, that the included
SSA countries are spread within the SSA region and there
is no evidence of a well-defined data generating process
by which the SSA countries were picked therefore sample
selection bias is unlikely to be too severe. With regards to
missing data, of the 186 observations, 90 % of the data
have complete sets of observations so the missing data
problem will have limited consequence in OLS estimation
even if more data is lost through lagging or first
differencing. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of key variables
Table 1 continued 
Sources: aWorld Development Indicators; bOECD-DAC's
online SourceOECD database; cWorld Bank's Africa
Database C; dSachs and Warner (1995); eConstructed
variable; fInternational Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of
Political Risk Services (PRS) and gDefined in detail in text.
Table 1 contains definitions and descriptive statistics of
variables based on six four-year observations and
provides detailed information about data sources and
transformations of key variables used in the growth
regressions in (1–3). The conversion of the annual data
into four year periods is consistent with the time it takes
for aid to manifest into growth (Moreira, 2005 and
Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 2004). Correlations
between the main explanatory variables used in the
analysis are presented in Table 2 on the next page. The
correlations between the variables are low, typically less
than 0.4, indicating that multicollinearity is not severe and
should not distort statistical inference. Aid is negatively
correlated to political stability and initial GDP, respectively
(-0.19) and (-0.24), implying aid is not systematically
allocated to politically stable countries. 
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Variable Description Mean Min
(SD) (Max)
Growth in per cap Based on real GDP per  0.400 -14.08
GDP (GROWTH) capita in constant US (4.760) (32.13)
dollars.a
Initial GDP (IGDP) * Real GDP per capita in the 688.929 56.52
$ 100 000 000 last year preceding (937.94) (4599)
the period for which the
growth rate is calculated.a
Aid (AID) Net Official Development 0.1914 0.001
Assistance (ODA) disburse- (0.2520) (1.70)
ments as a percentage of 
GDP.b&c
Primary Schooling Years of primary 6.1621 4.00
(PRIM) education.a (0.7100) (8.00)
Financial Depth (M2) Money and quasi-money 25.0366 -8.10
(M2) as a percentage of (35.04) (368.4)
GDP. a
Life Expectancy (LE) Life expectancy at birth, 46.2442 10.00
total (years).a (12.491) (63. 06)
Political Stabilty (PS) This is an assessment both 6.8130 1.70
Government of the government‟s ability (2.4091) (10.700)
(GCONS) to carry out its declared
program(s), and its ability 
to stay in office. f
Gov consumption 15.3340 5.9
expenditure as a % of (6.454) (50.1)
GDP. a
Time Dummies Each Dummy takes a value 0.00000
of 1 for particular period (1.000)
and 0 otherwise. The six 
4-year time periods starts 
from 1984–1987 and end 
with 2004–2007. e
Variable Description Mean Min
(SD) (Max)
Standard Deviation Square root of the 1.52 0.17
of Aid variance of Aid (0.0002) (0.2)
Assessment of factors 
affecting risk to investment 
not covered by other political 
risk components. Ranges 5.7790 0.500
Investment profile from 0–12. 12 is very low (2.0743) (10.80)
(INVPROF) risk and 0 is high risk. f
Democratic This is a measure of how
Accountability responsive government is to
its people. The minimum is 0 
and represents the highest
highest risk. The maxmum 2.605 0.200
is 6 and represents lowest (1.1236 ) (5.60)
risk.f
Bureaucratic Quality This is a measure of the 1.4130 0.000
(BQUAL) quality of the bureaucracy. (1.025) (4.00)
Ranges from 0–4 with 4 
being the lowest risk.f
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Note: The SAA countries in the analysis include: Angola,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Congo DR, Cote
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.
Figure 1 provides a plot of the measure of political stability
(PS) against growth rates. The PS measure is an
assessment of the quality of governance, the
government’s ability to carry out its declared program (s)
and its ability to stay in office. The rating is the sum of
three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of
four points and a minimum score of zero points. The
subcomponents of the PS measure are government unity,
legislative strength and popular support. For each
subcomponent, a score of four points equates to very low
risk and a score of zero points to very high risk. As a
consequence of how its subcomponents are defined, a
PS score of twelve points equates to very low risk (stable)
and zero points to very high risk (unstable). 
The PS measure was constructed using data from
PRS’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset
which covers 182 countries from 1980–2008 and is
widely considered by political science researchers as the
most reliable and comprehensive data on political stability
available. The PS measure makes sense for the principal
argument of this paper since good governance, and a
lack of conflict reflected in government unity, legislative
strength and popular support contributes to growth by
making aid more effective. The sub-components of the
PS capture the milder forms of political stability which
likely affect the aid-growth relationship even in the
absence of catastrophic events such as wars making the
PS measure the best one for our purposes. Further, note
that although the ICRG data has been widely used in the 
literature on corruption and governance, (see La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, (1997)) its use is not as
widespread in the aid and growth literature. The popularity
of the ICRG data has, however, increased recently as
Knack and Keefer (2001) and Brautigam and Knack
(2004) both employed PRS’s ICRG data to study the
impacts of aid on institutions and governance in SSA
while Rajan and Subramanian (2008), Arnd et al (2010),
and Minoiu and Reddy, (2010) employ the measure in aid-
growth regressions. These authors reported that the
political stability measures provided meaningful and
intuitive findings. It is also noteworthy that the PRS data
accurately captures changes in historical political stability
among countries and over time as will be explained.
Further, other more "recent" governance indicators e.g.
Mo Ibrahim's index of governance provide rankings of
countries which are consistent with the political stability
measure used in this study providing some comfort that
our measure is accurate. A final attribute of the PRS’s
ICRG dataset is that it provides the widest range of
stability data both in terms of the number of SSA
countries available and years covered and uses a well
documented and reliable method where country experts
rate countries over time and is thus a perfect fit for our
purposes. It is possible to have slight differences in PS
scores for particular countries say for Liberia relative to
Ghana and South Africa in terms of ex post accuracy of
forecast which may reflect the bias of the experts
measuring the stability conditions. However such biases
are likely to be time-invariant and will disappear when FD
estimation is employed as was done in this paper.
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Table 2 Correlation matrix of selected explanatory variables
IGDP Aid POL PS PRIM M2 BQUAL DACC LE GCONS INVPROF
IGDP 1
AID -0.1972 1
POL -0.0643 0.3644 1
PS -0.0096 -0.2487 0.083 1
PRIM 0.0323 0.2071 -0.03 0.0906 1
M2 0.3038 0.1295 0.199 -0.1076 0.422 1
BQUAL 0.3684 -0.2402 0.003 0.0044 -0.098 0.1415 1
DACC 0.1163 -0.1725 -0.02 0.3078 - 0.026 - 0.1911 0.2047 1
LE -0.055 0.132 -0.09 -0.2365 0.2141 0.1048 0.328 -0.0638 1
GCONS 0.0609 0.1105 0.229 -0.319 -0.305 0.1675 -0.0262 -0.0868 -0.136 1
INVPROF 0.0527 -0.1642 0.179 0.696 0.0915 -0.0562 0.1042 0.4819 -0.288 - 0.2083 1
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Figure 1 Growth vs political stability, all SSA
countries, 1984–2007
Figure 2 Political stability for the most stable 
SSA countries, 1984–2007
Figure 3 Political stability for the least stable 
SSA countries, 1984–2007
Figure 4 Political stability for SSA countries, 
2004–2007
Figure 5 political stability for SSA countries, 
1996–1999
Figures 2 to 5 shows that the measure of PS is a credible
measure of political conditions. For each country, there is
variation in the PS measure over time, and for each
period, there is variation across countries in the PS
measure. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that there is
variation over time in the measure of PS not only for the
most stable SSA countries like Ghana, South Africa and
Tanzania, who have average PS values greater then 6.8
(the mean PS), but also for the least stable SSA countries
like Congo (DRC), Somalia and Liberia for which average
PS is less than 6.8 or the mean PS. For both the least
stable and the most stable set of countries (Figure 2 and
3), the bulk of the high PS numbers is concentrated at the
end of the data range, while the opposite holds true for
the low PS numbers. This indicates a general rise in
political stability of the SSA region more recently for the
least stable countries and is consistent with observation.
Further, the PS index values appear to correspond to
perceptions of the political situation for the SSA countries
over time. For example, Liberia has higher PS score for
2003–2007 than for 1996–1999, when it was still plagued
by conflict and uncertainty. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that
for each year there is heterogeneity in the score of PS for
SSA countries. Visual inspection of Figures 4 and 5
reveals that for the countries that are neither the least
stable nor the most unstable, political stability has
declined from 1999–2007, but only very slightly. The
appendix contains the list of the SSA countries used in
the research.
Methods
The empirical growth model in (1) is applied to thirty-one
SSA countries from 1984–2007. Before estimating (1), the
annual data were converted to four-year averages,
because one-year intervals are too short to capture
growth rates (Deaton, 2008). 
The possibility that endogeneity bias may arise from
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different sources (simultaneity or unobserved effects), the
small size of our sample, and the lack of valid instruments
for the potentially endogenous aid and political stability
variables posed peculiar econometric challenges for the
estimation of the growth equation. A small sample size
typically causes problems in estimation of the aid-growth
relation because the traditional IV estimation techniques
used to correct for endogeneity bias such as two-stage
least square (2SLS) produces inconsistent estimates
when the sample size is small (Woolridge, 2002). Further,
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity have low
power in finite samples and may not detect endogeneity
bias even when it is present. Even when the number of
observations is sufficient, which would normally make
traditional IV estimates consistent, traditional IV-type
regressions are of little use in correcting endogeneity bias
specifically in aid-growth regressions (Deaton, 2008). This
is because in the context of SSA, none of the “standard”
instruments for aid in the literature such as population
(see BD, 2000 and Islam, 2005), and primary exports (see
Bruckner, 2011) satisfies a major requirement for
instrument validity: zero correlation between the
instrument and the error term (exogeneity).
The aid-literature has paid even less attention to
evaluating whether the “standard” set of instruments for
aid is sufficiently strong. This may be because most of the
significant contributions to the aid literature occurred in
the twentieth century while the literature on weak
instrument (see Stock and Yogo (2005)) emerged more
recently. Further, when instruments are weak, IV
estimation is inconsistent (Bound, Jaegger and Baker,
1993). We therefore drop instrumental variable (IV)
analysis as a strategy for mitigating simultaneity bias. 
Unobserved effects can be either time-varying or time
invariant. Latent and time-invariant variables such as
cultural norms and historical tensions that affect growth
also affect aid, political stability and policy, so that
unobserved effects may account for a considerable
portion of the total endogeneity bias. Time-invariant
unobserved effects can be removed by first differencing
(FD). If such a strategy eliminates endogeneity bias we
should notice corrected signs and stronger statistical
significance of coefficients and better fit of the FD model
relative to OLS. Further, we lag the endogenous variables
so that they are predetermined in the aid equation to
reduce the possibility of simultaneity. 
The structure of the first difference (FD) formulation of the




The observant reader will notice that as it stand the
structure of (4)–(6) does provide detailed information
about the time relationships in the data and makes the
point that FD removes latent time invariant country-
specific effects. However these equations (4–6) do not
automatically account for violations of strict exogeneity
due to feed forward effects or due to unobserved but
time-varying country-specific effects. We therefore test for
strict exogeneity before carrying out estimations.
Given sufficient data, however, GMM is the optimal
estimation method because it treats both unobserved
endogeneity and simultaneity endogeneity (Hansen and
Tarp, 2001). However, although we did perform such
GMM estimations in previous versions of this paper we do
not rely on results of the GMM dynamic panel model
because it is likely fraught with finite sample bias since our
dataset is small. Our current strategy of lagging AID, PS
and AIDPS and estimating by FD eliminates all the
unobserved endogeneity and is the correct estimation
method. Fixed-Effects (FE) is not applicable here,
because the data is not strictly exogenous. Residual
simultaneity may persist however despite lagging PS, AID
and AIDPS. 
Islam (2005) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) treat
simultaneity with IV and find no significant simultaneity
bias  since estimates of aid are the same as OLS in
magnitude but Aguir (2011) using rainfall and primary
exports as instruments for aid concludes that simultaneity
biases his estimates upwards in IV estimation. In
comparison, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgard and
Hansen (2003) both use GMM and find contrasting
results. While the former notes differences between GMM
and OLS estimates, the latter does not find any
differences so the controversy about the effect of
endogeneity (direction and size) persists in the literature. 
Ashesi Economics Lectures Series Journal  13 Volume 1, issue 1
ΔGROWTHit = γ0 + γAID ΔAIDit-1
+γSAIDΔAIDit-12 + γPSit-1 +
γAIDPS ΔAIDPSit-1 +
ΔZ’it γz + Δυit
βFD = (ΔΧ’ ΔΧ)-1 ΔΧ’ ΔΧ
Ε (εit εit’) = σ2
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Discussion of results
The empirical strategy was executed to (i) identify and
quantify the effect of foreign aid on growth in SSA (ii) to
determine if political stability influences the aid-growth
relationship, and (iii) to address any endogeneity problems
that emerge. The main results of estimation of the growth
equation (1) are presented in Table (3) on the next page.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 display results of estimation
of equation (1) respectively by OLS, and FD. In contrast,
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 contain the same regressions
in columns 1 and 2 but with PS dropped to evaluate how
important the influence of political stability is to the aid-
growth relationship. Finally note that AIDt-1, PSt-1 and
AIDPSt-1 are lagged in the FD estimations (columns 2
and 4) but not in the OLS regressions (columns 1 and 3).
This means for the FD estimations (but not the OLS
regressions), AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1 are pre-
determined in the growth regression so there is little
simultaneity bias. OLS estimation was performed with
both lagged and contemporaneous aid, political stability
and their interactions (AIDt, PSt and AIDPSt) but results of
only the contemporaneous variables are reported (as
there is little difference between the two) to facilitate
comparison of our OLS results with estimated coefficients
of the aid-growth relationship in the literature. All
regressions in Table 3 (right) are corrected for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity using FGLS.
The FD estimations appear to fit the data better than
the OLS because their coherence measures such as t-
values of individual coefficients are higher than the OLS
values irrespective of whether political stability is in the
equation or not. The major results of the research as
presented in the different Columns of Table 3 are that aid
and political stability both positively impact growth in SSA
and that political stability enhances the growth-stimulating
powers of aid. This is because from Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 3, aid, political stability and their interactions are
positively related to growth at five percent significance
level, respectively, by OLS and FD although the
magnitude of the aid coefficient in the FD equation is
smaller than in the OLS equation. Most importantly, since
AIDPS, the interaction of aid and political stability is also
significant, we conclude that conditional on stability aid
promotes growth. 
The reduction in magnitude of the coefficient on aid for
the FD estimate may be explained by the difference in the
level of endogeneity treatment that OLS and FD
respectively provide. Omitted variable bias, which cannot
be reduced by OLS, went down with FD, indicating that
unobserved country-specific effects constitute the
majority of any possible omitted variable bias. Any 
Note: Each regression included a set of time dummies.
Errors are corrected for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity. The AID, PS and AIDPS variables are
all lagged one period in the FD estimations. Three outliers
identified in the text, were deleted in each regression. The
square of AID and the time dummies are never significant
and are not reported. Student t-statistics in parentheses.*
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*** significant at
1%***
remaining bias has to be time-varying as FD removes all
time-invariant sources of bias. Although we are able to
remove the time-invariant unobserved effects by FD,
endogeneity bias, albeit very limited, may still exist due to
simultaneity despite lagging AID, AIDPS and PS. 
We evaluated the possibility of endogeneity arising
from simultaneity in earlier versions of the paper. In
particular, we estimated the aid-growth equations by 
IV after re-specifying the model as a system of 
4-simultaneous equations. Although first stage regression
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Table 3 Growth regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FD OLS FD
IGDP -0.0001 -0.003 0.009 -0.001
(-1.15) (2.04)* (-0.39) (0.97)
AID 12.05 8.066 0.232 5.775
(2.19)* (2.62)* (0.15) (1.95)
PS 1.084 1.593
(4.12)*** (4.94)***
PRIM 0.098 0.744 0.043 1.299
(0.22) (0.25) (0.09) (0.45)
M2 0.049 0.106 0.049 0.108
(1.64) (2.51)* (1.39) (1.92)
BQUAL 0.727 1.303 0.583 0.99
(1.61) (1.98)* (1.37) (1.41)
DACC 0.253 1.535 0.363 1.102
(0.77) (2.13)* (1.1) (1.51)
GCONS -0.007 -0.095 -0.004 -0.198
(-0.18) (-0.84) (-0.1) (1.44)
LE 0.013 0.184 0.024 0.157
(0.46) (2.00)* (0.76) (1.69)
INVPROF 0.078 0.946 0.483 0.025
(0.3) (1.5) (2.56)* (0.06)
AIDPS 0.872 0.332 (1.69) (1.98)*
STD_AID -1.861 -6.214 2.415 -2.416
(-0.57) (-1.63) (0.84) (-0.76)
Constant -8.48 -4.643
(2.29)* (-1.32)
Observations 167 102 167 102
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.55 0.19 0.4
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F-statistics and the Stock and Yogo (2005) test
suggested the instruments were not very strong, we got
very similar results in terms of the signs and magnitudes
of the coefficients on (AIDt-1, PSt-1 and AIDPSt-1) to the
OLS so simultaneity does not appear to be an issue but
unobserved effect endogeneity is an issue. The absence
of potentially important time-varying factors from the list of
regressors could also undermine the robustness of
regression results but previous iterations of the paper
using such time-varying factors as inflation or Burnside
and Dollars’ (2000) policy variable did not significantly
influence the results.
Given sufficient number of observations, a dynamic
system GMM will be the best estimator to treat
simultaneity concurrently with unobserved, time-invariant
endogeneity if in fact simultaneity and unobserved effects
endogeneity were really issues. Contrary to our, fears,
however, simultaneity is not the issue here so FD suffices.
We performed system GMM but the results in terms of
the magnitude and signs of AID, PS and AIDPS are similar
to FD. 
For completeness, note that there may still be an
endogeneity problem if there are unobserved time-varying
country-specific characteristics that influence aid and
growth. For example, some SSA countries may have
different technologies of production, endowment, or
institutions which can vary with time rendering FD
estimation impotent at treating endogeneity. Angrist and
Pischke (2009) (hence forth AP (2009) point out that the
notion that "the important omitted variables are time-
constant is implausible." Simple first-differencing may not
be effective in this case so the estimation method should
also address the endogeneity caused by time-varying
variables. To account for this issue, in earlier versions of
the paper, we used the "random growth" specification
(Papke, 1994) that allows for endogeneity to be based on
country-specific growth rates. We interacted a trend
variable with the country dummies in a LSDV specification
to accomplish this. This did not change the OLS results
much so it seems that the bias is mainly based on time-
invariant variables. Finally, given that the sample size is
small which compromised the strength of the instruments
for aid in GMM and IV these estimation strategies offer no
improvement over FD. 
In comparison to results in columns 1 and 2, aid and
political stability are insignificant in Columns 3 and 4
where political stability is omitted indicating political
stability is an important pre-condition for aid. The majority
of the coefficients of the other variables in our model have
the expected sign in both OLS and FD estimations, where
PS is included, although not many have statistically
significant coefficients.
To determine the economic relevance of the aid-growth
relationship in SSA, we compute the marginal effects
(MEs) of growth with respect to aid. The MEs were
calculated for the OLS and FD estimations in columns 1
and 2 of Table 3. We obtained a value of 0.12 for the ME
of growth with respect to aid using OLS where aid is not
lagged so that a one percent increase in aid will lead to a
0.12 percent increase in growth. In other words since AID
is scaled by GDP, a $1 increase in aid will lead to a $0.12
increase in GDP. Further, we obtain a value of 0.084 for
the same ME using FD where aid is lagged after taking
the significant AIDPS in the FD regression into account. In
comparison, Islam (2005) finds using OLS (and data from
all LDCs not just SSA) that a unit increase in aid as a
fraction of GDP, increases growth by 0.12 percent for
LDCs. This agrees with our results. 
A potential concern about the robustness of the
primary conclusions of the research that aid is more
effective in more stable countries concerns the limitation
of PS measure because it does not explicitly  reflect
corruption which can often been an overriding problem.
However we did replace the PS measure with the
corruption perception index (CPI) in previous estimations
and arrived at the same conclusion because more
corruption was associated with less growth. In any case
INVPROF also captures corruption effects. The result of
the analysis should, however, be interpreted with care
because about 30% of ODA aid is multi-lateral aid and
the remaining 70% is bilateral aid although we used total
ODA aid in the research. It is also worth noting, that the
strategy of the new players in aid donation China and
India (former recipients of aid) of providing aid to improve
or build vital infrastructure in SSA (National Public Radio)
may in the end yield better results than ODA which often
does not focus on improving infrastructure in the recipient
country.
Decomposition of the effect of
political stability on the Aid-Growth
Regression: marginal effects and
elasticities at different points (0–12)
of PS
To further decompose the effect of PS on the aid-growth
relationship, we compute the aid-growth effect at different
values of PS. From Figure 6, the marginal effect (ME) of
aid on growth computed at the median of growth and aid
is positive and rises very gradually at low levels of PS.
Keeping in mind that the PS scale is from 0–12 with 12
being most stable, it can be seen that at very high levels
of PS (higher than the mean and median of PS), ME rises
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precipitously. In fact, AID, AIDPS and PS are all weakly
significant below a PS value of 6 at 5% significance level.
At PS values greater than 6 (the median of PS), these
variables are strongly significant at 5% significance level. 
Figure 6 Partial effects at different levels of political
stability
Figure 7 Elasticity at different levels of political
stability
Figure 7, which plots the elasticity of growth with respect
to aid against PS, substantiates the point made in figure 6
because it shows that growth is inelastic at low levels of
PS but elastic at very high levels of PS. Beyond the
relatively high PS value of 10, a one percent increase in
aid leads to a greater than one percent increase in growth.
However, the majority of poor SSA countries have PS
values lower than 10 which might explain of why the effect
of aid on growth is sometimes difficult to discern in SSA. 
Conclusion
The research objective was to determine the sign and
economic relevance of the relationship between aid and
growth in SSA and further to investigate the consequence
of political stability and economic policies on the aid-
growth relationship. The evidence suggests that aid and
growth are positively related at the five percent
significance level, that political stability has a strong
influence on the aid-growth relationship in SSA and that
the aid-growth relationship suffers from endogeneity bias
caused primarily by unobserved effects. Our results help
to clarify why so much aid has done so little good in SSA.
Aid is currently given independent of country stability.
Based on our findings, aid is more effective at higher
levels of stability so reaching the millennium development
goals is more likely when aid is provided to stable SSA
countries. Aid can prevent starvation in poor unstable
SSA countries, but cannot be expected to spur growth
there. A policy recommendation of this paper is that the
pursuit of political stability and good governance in SSA is
not only a worthy objective in itself, but also because
stability promotes growth and augments the growth-
promoting power of aid. To make the principal results of
this research that political stability makes aid more
efficient at promoting growth-more meaningful, the
determinants of political stability specifically in SSA are
good candidates for further research. In particular it will be
interesting to investigate how big a role a free press plays
in the attainment of political stability. Preliminary evidence
(Armah and Amoah, 2010) seem to suggest that in SSA,
political stability is fragile in one direction and stable and
restrictive in the other direction when the press is
restrained. However little empirical evidence is available in
the literature to refute or back this claim so more careful
research into the problem is needed. Further research is
also needed to find out if growth is linked with media
freedom in SSA. 
Finally the literature could benefit from more detailed
investigation in the issue of time-varying observed
endogeneity. AP (2009) suggest a way to check the
robustness of estimation when there is the possibility of
residual bias due to latent but time-varying country-specific
effects. Their suggestion involves first performing an Arrelano
and Bond (1991) or AB-type dynamic panel estimation.
However, they note that this estimate may be inconsistent if
the lagged dependent variables are not uncorrelated with the
error term and thus are not appropriate instruments. To
check robustness, they suggest performing two separate
regressions (a) with the lagged dependent variable but no
country-specific dummies and (b) without time dummies but
with country-specific dummies. AP (2009) point out that if
estimates of the slopes using AB-type estimation is
statistically significant and is value is bracketed by the
estimates from the regressions  a and b, the time-varying
endogeneity is not a significant issue. Despite Angrist and
Pischke (2009) suggestions effective methods of treating
endogeneity caused by latent time-varying country-specific
effects remain elusive.
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Appendix 1
The United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Millennium Development Goals Targets
1 Eradicate extreme poverty i. Reduce by half the number of people living on less than $1/day.
and hunger ii. Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
2 Achieve universal primary i. Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling.
education
3 Promote gender equality i. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary school education, preferably
& empower women by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.
4 Reduce child mortality i. Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under 5.
5 Improve maternal health i. Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio.
6 Combat HIV/AIDS malaria i. Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.
and other major diseases ii. Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. 
7 Ensure Environmental i. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies &
sustainability programs, reverse loss of environmental resources.
ii. Reduce by 1/2 the number of people w/o sustainable access to safe drinking 
water.
iii. Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
by 2020.
8 Develop a global  i. Develop further an open rule based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and
partnership for financial system; Includes a commitment to good governance, poverty reduction 
development both nationally and internationally. Address the special needs of the least 
developed countries; includes tariffs and quota free access for LDC exports; 
enhanced debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and 
cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous development assistance 
(ODA) for countries committed to poverty reduction.
ii. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small Island developing 
States.
iii. In cooperation with developing countries, develop, and implement strategies that 
with generate employment for the youth.
iv. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies provide access to affordable and 
essential drugs in developing countries.
v. In cooperation with the private sector, make available new technology especially 
in IT &communication.
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Abstract
Poverty levels in Ghana have largely been high
among rural dwellers. The study assess the ex ante
risk that if an individual is not currently below the
poverty line, will slip past it, and the ex post
possibility that those who are already in poverty will
remain in it with increased severity. 
The FGT poverty class of index was first used.
This showed that a proportion of 0.77 of the entire
population under investigation was poor. Also, the
poor trade hugely among themselves at 0.74
redistribution rate. 
Furthermore, to investigate the major determinants
of poverty in Ghana resulting from free-riding, a
dichotomous logit model was used. Most importantly,
female household heads were found to be more
vulnerable to poverty relative to their male
counterparts. It was also observed that there has
been a ‘poverty-switching’ phenomenon from the
savannah zone to the coastal and forest zones of
Ghana with deplorable consequences.
Key words: Incidence of Poverty, Free-riding, Logit,
FGT Poverty class of index, Ghana
JEL: D030, D190, I320, I380, J160, J170, R290
Introduction
Poverty in Ghana has over the years been a major
militating factor to economic development. In 2006, the
poverty headcount ratio showed that about 53.7% of the
total population was living on at most $2 a day (ADI,
2010). Thus, in the spirit of poverty measures, majority of
the total population could be considered as poor at the
time. However, the source of these levels of poverty
cannot be attributed to the individuals’ own
characteristics alone. As noted by Rice (2001), studies by
Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler confirm what most
attribution research on poverty finds: people are most
likely to blame the poor for their own poverty. 
In a society where family ties transcend the borders of
one’s own nuclear family, there is a high tendency for
increased dependency. Though the ratio of age
dependency on the working population has been
declining (rather slowly) in recent times, the values are still
higher and thus leave enough room for concern. In 2008,
the dependency ratio on the working population was
about 73.32, slightly lower than the 2007, 2006, and
2005 values of about 74.15, 75.02, and 75.90,
respectively (ADI, 2010). 
With a mean household size of about 4 individuals,
with Greater Accra region recording the lowest at 3.4 and
the Upper West region recording the highest at 6.5 (GSS,
2007), coupled with an average annual household income
of about GH¢1,217.00 and an average per capita income
of about GH¢400 in Ghana, the dependency rate on the
working population is undoubtedly significant. Given that
average annual household expenditure in Ghana hovers
around GH¢1,918.00 and an annual per capita
consumption expenditure around GH¢644.00 (ibid), it is
quite surprising how the poor survives with lower
incomes, as noted above. This undoubtedly leads to a
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highly significant financial burden. The figure below shows
that the mean annual per capita income of the lowest
quintile of Ghana’s working population is just above
GH100, whiles the highest quintile almost touches the
GH 700 mark. A very significant gap of about GH 600 is
thus observed.
Figure 1 Mean annual capital income
Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2008
Closely related to these developments is the fact that, as
at 2008, seven out of every ten adults aged 15 to 64 were
engaged actively in economic activities, ibid. However,
having been engaged in any of the three most important
sources of household income from economic activities in
Ghana-income from agricultural activities (35%), wage
income from employment (29%) and income from self
employment (25%)-returns that accrue from such
activities are spent partly on dependents. As much as this
exists as a truism, the rate of dependency varies from
males to females, depending on who is the family head.
The GLSS-5 indicates that a bigger proportion of
households are headed by males (70.5%). The proportion
of households headed by females is higher in urban areas
outside of Accra (35.1%), rural coastal (34.3%) and rural
forest (31.2%) than in Accra (28.1%) and rural savannah
(14.9%). On the other hand, the proportion of households
headed by males is highest in the rural savannah (85.1%). 
These working household heads usually become the
focus of all who seek financial support at any point in
time. As a matter of social and family responsibility to give
to the needy, society has ignored the consequences of
such dependencies on individuals who are usually over-
burdened with requests from their dependents.
Additionally, for the sake of moral uprightness, it is only
appropriate to support the needy. However, it is very
difficult to define the members of a given ‘basket’ of
dependents. People tend to free-ride on the provision of
moral requirement and thus individual support becomes
non-excludable to the extent that a potential benefactor is
identified. By this, financial assistance can be likened to a
public1 good, loosely defined. Though this appears to be
the case, unlike ‘pure public goods’, financial assistance
is highly rival2 in consumption. Interestingly, most of those
who pose such financial burdens usually do not
contribute to the generation of such finances directly. We
tend to ignore the possibility of such actions rendering
these benefactors poor some time in their lives and
eventually joining the pool of poor individuals.
It may seem obvious that males are at the front of such
barrage of inconsequential dependencies. This is
because, most households are headed by males (GSS-5,
2008) and thus the dependency rates tend to be higher
for males than for female workers in the family. Typically,
even in a family where both males and females are in
some form of formal employment it is usually the males
who are overburdened with such financial commitments.
Consequently, most people tend to stall in their career
development process, lifetime investments, as well as
raising a happy family. Increased dependency may lead to
increased dwindling standards of living. 
Figure 2 (below) shows that female-headed
households are on average less poor than male-headed
households. 
Over time, most people find themselves living below
the $1 poverty mark per day. In a study by Bane et al
(1986), they observed that less than 40% of poverty spells
occurred when the income of the household head
reduced, whereas about 60% of all poverty spells ended
with an increase in the household head’s income. This is
in support of the argument that over-dependency, which
tends to reduce the income of household heads ensures
increased poverty, whereas low dependency has a milder
effect.
Figure 2 Poverty incidence by gender of household
head, 1991/92 TO 2005/2006 
Poverty line: ¢3,708,900.
Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2008
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1 This can be described as any good that can and does
benefit everybody at no cost to the beneficiary.
2 Financial assistance is rivalry because the benefits that
accrue to individuals vary depending on who has the first-
mover-advantage, all else being equal.
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It is important to note that dependence on the working
population is inevitable and that at the very least could be
a function of one other individual. Eventually, poverty
becomes inevitable. The GSS (2007) defines poverty as
consisting of consumption poverty, which is concerned
with those whose standard of living falls below an
adequate minimum defined by a poverty line. Thus, a
poverty line, below which individuals are considered as
poor was constructed and noted to be GH370.89. The
table below shows the regional distribution of poverty
within the Ghanaian economy.
It is observed from Figure 3 that by the 1991/1992
period, the Upper West region of Ghana had the highest
level of poverty, with Greater Accra recording the lowest.
The pattern has generally remained so for most part of
the period before 2005/2006. Most worrying is the 88%
incidence of poverty on the population of the Upper West
region of Ghana. However, in about a decade, the
incidence of poverty in the Greater Accra region rose from
5% in 1998/1999 period to 12% in 2005/2006. Apart
from Greater Accra and Upper West regions that have
experienced increases in poverty rates since 1998/1999,
Central, Western, Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Upper
East and Northern regions have actually witnessed
declines over the period up to 2005/2006.
Figure 3 Poverty incidence by administrative region,
1991/92 TO 2005/2006 
Poverty line: ¢3,708,900
Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2008
In view of the above, this study seeks to investigate the
basic individual characteristics that make them
vulnerability to poverty as a result of being over-burdened
with dependency (free-riding). That is, the study assess
the ex ante risk that if an individual is not currently below
the poverty line, will slip past it, and the ex post possibility
that those who are already in poverty will remain in it with
increased severity.
Literary review
Empirical work on the incidence of poverty in Ghana with
emphasis on free-riding is at best non-existent. Most of
the previous studies on poverty concentrate on the
determinants of poverty, their effects on economic
growth, and regional distribution of poverty. Yet, some
other studies including Brown et al (2004) take a rather
new position, noting that various livelihood strategies-
cohabitation, doubling-up with some other relatives, and
working-have the potential of reducing poverty. In their
study of livelihood strategies of nonmetropolitan single
mothers in the United States of America, they noted that
the above mentioned livelihood strategies are strongly
associated with economic well-being. Most importantly,
they viewed employment as a panacea to economic well-
being reform. However, work-based solution to poverty
may seem inadmissible by individuals who have little or no
formal education or job training coupled with the
unavailability of jobs that pay living wages in
predominantly rural areas.
Adam and Sawhill (2001) concur that the correlation
between family structure, vis-à-vis single parenthood or
married couple, and poverty status persists when studied
over time. In another study by Lichter et al (2004) in which
they estimated the effect of having a child out of wedlock
on a woman’s probability of being poor after having
controlled for women’s demographic characteristics and
employment status, they observed that the incidence of
single parenthood has a considerable impact on the
incidence of poverty. Another relevant study by Wilson
and Neckarman (1987) argues that much of the growth in
black female headship of households is due to the rising
male joblessness, which eventually leads to a reduction in
the available pool of “marriageable men”. 
Bauman (1997) observes that being in co-residence
with other relatives (not necessarily family) did not help in
any significant measure to alleviate financial hardships.
According to him the obvious reason for this effect is that
most of these dependents tend to keep their money to
themselves. Whiles they keep their money to themselves,
their daily livelihood in the households becomes the
burden of the household head. Consequently, household
heads become over-burdened with increased expenses
which eventually affect their financial soundness over
time. In confirmation to this, Gardiner et al. (2006) observe
that large families have much higher poverty rates than
average. This therefore brings to bear the weakness in the
recent method of calculating poverty in which the
incomes of all members of a given household (related by
blood) are summed together and compared with a given
income threshold depending on the size of the
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household. Of course there have been scores of
arguments pertaining to the proper definition of poverty.
Notable among them are Citro and Michael (1995) who
have argued that cohabiting individuals should be
counted as part of poverty measures as if they are
members of the same “family”. Yet, Mayer and Jencks
(1989) have argued that all persons living in a household
should be counted, regardless of family relationship.
However, due to the fact that these people do not
contribute to household expenditure financing in the most
part, none of the above suggestions may prove useful.
It may seem obvious that paid employment reduces
poverty at the individual level. In a study by Islam (2004),
he observed that employment intensity (measured in
terms of employment elasticity with respect to output) of
growth had a positive and significant influence on poverty
reduction. Similarly, in a study in the rain-fed traditional
farms in rural Sudan, Elzaki et al (2009) note that having a
job offers protection against poverty, but having only one
off-farm source of income is not enough to fight poverty
adequately.
It has also been empirically observed that female
household heads have a higher incidence of poverty
relative to their male counterparts, ibid. 
Elzaki et al. (2009) note once again that poverty is
much prevalent in households with a large number of
individuals (thus, high dependency rate) relative to those
with smaller number of individuals. Anyanwu (2005)
reached a similar conclusion in his study of rural poverty
in Nigeria.
Households with heads with at least vocational
education are observed to have a lower risk of poverty
compared with households where the heads have only
informal or primary education (Elzaki, 2009). In another
study by Anyanwu (2005) on rural poverty in Nigeria, he
observed that individuals with primary education and
below had a higher probability of being poor relative to
those with higher levels of education. Olaniyan (2000)
opines that the education level of the household head
was the single most important determinant of household
poverty in his study of the role of household endowments
in determining poverty in Nigeria.
The effect of age distribution also seems to play a very
significant role in the levels of poverty of individuals. As
individuals move up the age ladder, their levels of poverty
increase as well, ibid. However, at higher age brackets,
poverty levels tend to decline, albeit, marginally. He also
observes that individuals within the age group 45–54
contribute most to the levels of poverty in society, on a
rather consistent basis.
Methodology
1 Data and definitions of variables
Data for the study is obtained from the Ghana Living
Standard Survey (GLSS), round five, published by the
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS, 2008). Data covering
8,687 individuals are used in this study. Specifically, the
dataset comprises the gender of household head
(Gender), number of jobs ever done by individuals
(Numjob), household size (Hsize), marital status (Mars),
annual income of individuals (Income), total annual
household expenditure (Totexp), age of individuals (Age),
education level of individuals (Educlevel), individuals with a
second job (Secondjob), household head with second job
(Gensecondjob), age category of individuals with a
second job (Agesecjob), and ecological zone of
individuals (Ecolzone). ‘Gender’ tries to investigate
whether households are headed by males or females.
Male-headed households are denoted by 1, whiles
female-headed households are denoted by 0. ‘Mars’ also
investigates the marital status of individuals, with 1
denoting married and 0 not married. The ‘income’
variable is split into those whose annual earnings are
below the lower poverty line (GH370.89) and those
whose earnings exceed this value. ‘Totexp’ also considers
individuals who spend below GH 100 per annum, those
who spend between GH 100 and GH 2000 per annum,
and finally, those spend above GH 2000 per annum. The
‘Age’ categorization considers individuals between ages
15 and 30, 31 and 60, and 61 and beyond. Individuals
who have work in less than 10 different jobs over their
lifetime are also separated from those who have worked
in more than 10 jobs, in considering the ‘Numjob’
variable. The ‘Ecolzone’ variable categorizes individual
locations into coastal, forest, and savannah zones. Finally,
individuals with primary or no education, those with post
secondary education as well as vocational, teacher
training and diploma certificates are, and those with
university degrees are categorized. 
The data shows that seven out of every ten adults aged
15 to 64 are engaged in some form of economic activity
with majority being engaged in agricultural activities,
formal sector employment, and self employment. The
proportion of the economically active population aged 15
to 64 years who were not working in the last seven days
prior to the data collection but were available for work
were defined as the unemployed. The unemployment rate
was recorded at 3.6%. It was much higher in urban areas
(6.3%), particularly in Accra (8.9%) compared to rural
areas (1.6%), by 2008. In urban areas, the unemployment
rate was slightly higher for males (6.5%) than for females
(6.2%) but the reverse was the case in the rural areas.
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The employed were considered to be those who worked
for economic gain in the last seven days prior to the data
collection. 
The data goes on to indicate that about 58.5% of the
total population have ever been engaged in some form of
relationship, be it consensual union, marriage, divorced,
separated or widowed,  whilst 41.5% have never married. 
Due to the above considerations, this study seeks to
investigate on a broader note, the factors that contribute
to the incidence of poverty (IP) in the Ghanaian economy,
at the individual level. 
2 Emperical model
In 1976, Sen introduced a characterization of the poor
based on two key axioms: the monotonity axiom and the
transfer axiom. The monotonity axiom requires overall
poverty levels to increase if the income of a poor person
reduces. On the other hand, the transfer axiom postulates
that poverty levels will increase if a pure transfer is made
from a poor person to someone with more income.
However, the index is not decomposable into the various
categories of poverty (Foster and Shorrocks (1991) and
more importantly, it fails to satisfy the transfer axiom
(Shorrocks, 1995). In reaction to these weaknesses,
several other indices have emerged. The most famous
among them was developed by Foster, Greer and
Thorbecke (1984), usually called the FGT index. They
formulated an additively decomposable index of poverty
aversion based on the distance between the actual
income of a poor household and the poverty line. Several
studies including Ahmed et al (1991); Bigsten et al (2003);
Elzaki (2009); Greer and Thorbecke (1986); Haddad et al
(2001); and Bogale et al (2005) have used this approach
in studying various aspects of poverty. 
Thus, in this study, the FGT poverty class of index is
adopted. Given the income levels of households (yi) as a
measure of well-being in increasing order up to the nth
household, the FGT poverty class of index can be
expressed as (Teal, 2001):
1q                   z-yi




Where n is the total number of individuals under
consideration, q is the total number of poor people, yi is
the income of the ith individual, z is the poverty line, and α
is a parameter characterizing the degree of poverty
aversion. The value of z to be used is the national
absolute (lower) poverty line provided by GSS (2007). This
measure focuses on what an adult per year needs to
meet the nutritional requirements of their households. So,
individuals whose total expenditure falls below this
poverty line are considered to be poor. This is because,
even if they devoted their entire budgets to food, they
would not be able to meet their minimum nutritional
requirements. Based on this measure, this study uses a
poverty line of GH370.89 per adult per year. The most
common values of α used in most empirical works are 0,
1 and 2. When α=0, then we arrive at the poverty head
count ratio (or the fraction of poor people in a given
population which measures the incidence of poverty),
when α=1, we obtain the poverty gap (how far, on
average, the poor is away from the poverty line), and
when α=2, the severity5 of poverty (which gives more
emphasis to the poorest of the poor) is obtained. 
Subsequently, to estimate the causes of poverty and
the probability of falling below the poverty line, the
approach of Bogale et al (2005), Elzaki et al (2009),
Francis (2006), and Krishna et al (2006), in which a binary
logit model is specified is followed. Although the probit
model could be used in this study, Amemiya (1981)
observes that there exists a relationship between the logit
and probit estimates. Thus, it is possible to derive
estimates for the probit model after deriving those for the
logit model. So, I specify a binary logistic regression
(BLR)3 model of the form:
IP* = β0 + X’ β1 + μ (2)
Where X’ is a 1x22 matrix of independent variables and βi
represents a 22x1 matrix of coefficients.
IP* is an incompletely observed (latent) dichotomous
variable determined by:
1 if IP* > 0
IP{
2 if IP* ≤ 0
(3)
IP* represents a situation of high incidence of poverty,
whereas IP* ≤ 0 represents a situation of low incidence of
poverty. We also note that μ is independent of X and it
follows a logistic distribution. Following the specification
above (equation 3), the probability of observing a high
incidence of poverty (IP =1) is expressed below:
PR (IPi = 1l X) = P (IPi > 01X) = P μ > – (β0 + X’βi) lX]
= 1 – G [–(β0 + X’βi)]
= G [β0 + X’βi] (4)
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In the spirit of a logit regression model, this can be written
as:
exp (β0 + X’βi)
Pr (IPi = 1) = 1 + exp (β0 + X’βi) (5)
And:
Pr (IP = 01 X) = P (IP* ≤ 01X) = P [μ ≤ − (β0 + X’βi) I X]
= G [− (β0 + X’βi)]
(6)
or:
exp [ – (β0 + X’βi)]
Pr (IPi = 0) = 1 + exp [ – (β0 + X’βi)]
(7)
Corresponding odds ratios4 are computed using:
Pr (IPi = 1)   = eβ0 + X’βi  or  1n (Pr (IPi = 1) ) = β0 + X’βiPr (IPi = 0)                                Pr (IPi = 0)
(8)
Where G [β0 + X’βi] is the cumulative distribution function
for μ taking on values between 0 and 1 for all real
numbers (β0 + X’βi), that is, 0 < G [β0 + X’βi] < 1, ∀ (β0 +
X’βi) ∈ℜ, βi is the kth element of β. 
Unlike linear regression models, the non-linear nature of
equation (1) warrants the use of maximum likelihood
estimation methods. In order to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimator, conditional on the covariates, I
specify the density function ip given xi. Thus:
f (iplx1;β) = [G (χ1,β)]ip [1 – G (χi,β)]1-ip, ip = 0,1 (9)
β is absorbed into xi for simplicity. From the above, when
ip=1, we get G(x1,β) and when ip=0, we get 1-G(x1,β).
To obtain the log-likelihood function, we take the log of
the above equation which gives us:
li (β 1 xi) = ipi log [G (xiβ)] + (1 – ipi) log [1 – G(xiβ)] (10)
With 8,687 sample observations in this study, we obtain:
Li (β | xi) =∑
n
i=1
li (β | xi) (11)
The maximum likelihood estimate, β, maximizes this log-
likelihood, representing the logit estimator of our model.
The β estimates thus obtained are consistent,
asymptotically normal and asymptotically efficient, barring
the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The advantage with using a logit model lies in its easy
computations, ability to allow for easy application of
interaction terms in a regression model, ability to predict
probabilities, and the flexibility in interpreting coefficient
estimates.
Results
Upon estimating the FGT poverty class of index, the
results showed that when a=0, the poverty headcount
ratio or the proportion of total population that are poor is
about 0.77. Given that the data for the study is the most
current according to the GLSS (round 5), it can be
concluded that a large number of people still live in
poverty. Such individuals earn GH370.89 or below per
annum and thus are unable to cater for their basic
nutritional needs for the period. Coupled with high
dependency rates, the plight of such individuals are
worsened since they now have to share the already
insufficient income with some other dependents. Thus,
Ghana still has a high incidence of poverty.
When a=1, the poverty gap is about 0.75. This
measures, on average, how far the poor are away from
the lower poverty line. This shows that on a scale of 0 to
1, the poor population is very much below the poverty
line. There is therefore an enormous gap to be bridged in
subsequent years, given that the deadline for the
millennium development goals is fast approaching (2015). 
At a=2, a value of 0.74 shows that poverty is still
severe among the poorest of the poor. These people have
the huge task of trying to catch-up with the relatively not-
so-poor population before even worrying about jumping
the lower poverty line of GH 370.89. This also shows that
there is a high degree of redistribution of income among
the poor. This is due to the fact that the poor trade hugely
among themselves. Thus, they circulate and concentrate
the same amount of money among them over time.
In conclusion, much is desired in trying to fight poverty in
Ghana. Perhaps, the 2015 deadline for the achievement
of the MDGs appears to be fast approaching than policies
that are being implemented to ensure their achievement.
Results from the logit estimation are reported below.
These try to investigate the actual determinants of the
incidence of poverty in Ghana. From table 1.0 below, it is
observed that the annual income level of an individual,
total annual expenditure of an individual, household size,
individuals aged between 31 and 60 years, gender,
marital status, individuals with some level of education (at
the various levels), individuals with secondary jobs,
individuals who have worked in less than ten different jobs
over their lifetime, individuals aged between 15 and 30
(and 31 and 60) years who also have secondary jobs, and
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the ecological zone an individual resides in are the major
determinants of poverty in Ghana, at different significance
levels. 
Out of these variables the ones which are negatively
related to the probability of being poor are annual income
level of an individual, total annual expenditure of an
individual, individuals aged between 31 and 60 years,
gender, marital status, individuals with secondary jobs.
The rest of the variables are positively related to the
probability of being poor.
Contrary to the above, variables such as individuals
aged between 15 and 30 years, individuals with no
education, individuals who have worked in more than ten
different jobs over their lifetime, and the gender of
individuals with secondary jobs, do not contribute to the
incidence of poverty in Ghana, even at different
significance levels.
Marginal effects and odds ratios
Due to the non-linearity of the logistic regression model as
well as the dummy nature of regressors, there emerge
some complications with the use of marginal effects to
analyse the effects emanating from each regressor (see
Greene, 2003). Thus, to investigate the effects of the
regressors on the probability of being poor, the study
considers the change of the odds ratio as the regressand
changes. The odds ratio (OR) of a regressor is interpreted
using 100(1-OR) %. The results are reported in table 2.0.
Poverty and gender
Anyanwu (2005), Elzaki et al (2009) and Simler et al (2004)
have argued that female household heads have a higher
incidence of poverty compared to their male
counterparts. The results show that male household
heads are about 33.6% likely to be less poor compared
to their female counterparts. This therefore supports the
feminization of poverty phenomenon. The reason this is
the case is that most female household heads are largely
petty traders with wide poverty gaps. Furthermore, with
the responsibility of providing food and caring for the
households members who may largely be free-riders, they
are unable to take up more than one job like their male
counterparts do. Thus, increased number of dependents
increases the likelihood of female household heads being
poor.
Poverty and marital status
Most studies such as Adam and Sawmill (2001) and
Lichter et al (2000) have argued for the strong correlation
between the marital status of an individual and the
severity of poverty. The study shows that married
individuals decrease their probability of being poor by
37.5% relative to those who are not married. The obvious
reason is that married couples are able to pool together
resources to support one another, unlike the unmarried
individual who will have to depend on own limited
resources. Thus, married individuals are able to benefit
from ‘synergistic’ advantages that aid in their jumping
over the poverty line, basically due to the absence of
dependency because of the pooling of resources.
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Table 1.0: Determinants of poverty in Ghana
Variable Coefficient Standard P-Value
Error
Income -0.243 -6.328 0.073
Totexp1 0.512 0.001* 0.000*
Totexp2 -2.134 0.196 0.000*
Hsize1 2.611 0.531 0.000*
Hsize2 0.597 0.265 0.024**
Age1530 0.014 0.183 0.937
Age3160 -0.115 0.069 0.095***
Gender -0.409 0.143 0.000*
Mars -0.470 0.096 0.004*
Educlevel1 0.178 0.109 0.103
Educlevel2 0.961 0.124 0.000*
Educlevel3 1.037 0.333 0.002*
Educlevel4 1.116 0.327 0.001*
Educlevel5 1.265 0.391 0.001*
Numjobs1 0.360 0/137 0.009*
Numjobs2 0.089 0.415 0.831
Secondjob -0.327 0.207 0.072***
Gensecondjob 0.071 0.175 0.685
Age1530secjob 0.663 0.251 0.008*
Age3160secjob 0.474 0.188 0.012**
Ecolzone1 1.656 0.117 0.000*
Ecolzone2 1.607 0.090 0.000*
Constant 3.269 0.645 0.000*
Values approximated to 3 decimal places
Pseudo-R2 =  0.3484 Log likelihood = -2492.1328
LR CHI2(22) = 2664.77 PROB > CHI2 = 0.0000 
Number of observations = 8687
* Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 10%
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Poverty, age and jobs
Some studies (including Olaniyan, 2000) have argued that
the older an individual gets, the higher the probability of
being poor. The fundamental reason for this outturn is that
individuals become less productive at old age, coupled
with their inability to accumulate enough savings during
this period to compensate for the loss in productivity and
income. The period of old age is when previous savings
made during periods of productive activity are usually
spent. This study shows that any additional age of a
household head decreases the probability of such
individual being poor within ages 31 and 60 by 10.8%,
relative to those above age 60. Though individuals in such
age brackets suffer most from dependencies, this seems
to have a minimal effect on their wellbeing. This is due to
the fact that individuals in such age brackets are able to
engage in more productive jobs such that they earn
enough to take them out of the poverty zone. However,
household heads below age 30 do not contribute to
increased poverty rates in Ghana. 
On the other hand, household heads between ages 31
and 60 who have a secondary job increase their
probability of being poor by 60.7%, relative to older
household heads. As individuals earn more within this age
bracket, they are duly recognized as potential benefactors
in their families and societies. Hence, their financial
burdens increase with increased dependency rates.
Similarly, a household head between ages 15 and 30 who
also has a secondary job increases their probability of
being poor by 94.1% relative to those above age 60. This
outcome may not seem surprising at all as individuals
within this age bracket have a lower probability of
securing gainful employment opportunities. However, as
individuals advance in age, they are more likely to secure
high-paid jobs which reduce their vulnerability to poverty,
as evident from above.
Furthermore, individuals who have ever worked in less
than 10 different jobs over their lifetime increase the
likelihood of their being poor by 43.4% relative to those
who have worked in 10 or more jobs. This is so because
most of these individuals do not explore the job market
for better employment opportunities. They stay in one
employment situation for so long which usually come with
little improved finances, if any at all. However, those who
perform two different jobs concurrently are able to reduce
the probability of their being poor by 31.1% relative to
those who perform single jobs. Such individuals are able
to accumulate huge sums of money that ensure their
ability to exceed the poverty line. As argued by Elzaki et al
(2009), having a job offers protection against poverty, but
having only one off-farm source of income is not enough
to fight poverty adequately. This supports the finding that
secondary jobs are an important tool in poverty alleviation.
Poverty, and income/expenditure
levels
High income levels are expected to alleviate poverty in
every human society. As this study notes, any additional
increase in an individual’s income beyond the lower
poverty line (GH370.89) decreases the likelihood of being
poor by 21.6%. Individuals are now able to provide their
basic nutritional needs.
The results also suggest that individuals who spend
less than GH 100 are able to reduce their likelihood of
being poor by about 99.8% with any additional increase
in expenditure resulting from increased dependency (free-
riding) relative to those who spend above this value. Given
a lower poverty line of GH 370.89, this conclusion seems
valid as long as expenditure levels fall below the GH 100
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Table 2.0 Odds ratio estimates for the determinants
of poverty in Ghana
Variable Coefficient Standard P-Value
Error
Income 0.784 0.057 0.001*
Totexp1 0.002 0.001 0.000*
Totexp2 0.118 0.023 0.000*
Hsize1 13.609 7.222 0.000*
Hsize2 1.817 0.481 0.024**
Age 0.892 0.061 0.095***
Gender 0.892 0.061 0.095***
Mars 0.664 0.060 0.000*
Educlevel2 2.613 0.324 0.000*
Educlevel3 2.821 0.941 0.002*
Educlevel4 3.054 1.386 0.001*
Educlevel5 3.543 1.386 0.001*
Numjobs1 1.434 0.197 0/009*
Secondjob 0.689 0.143 0.072***
Age1530secjob 1.941 0.302 0.008*
Age3160secjob 1.607 0.061 0.012**
Ecolzone1 5.236 0.615 0.000*
Ecolzone2 4.987 0.449 0.000*
Values approximated to 3 decimal places
Pseudo-R2 =  0.3484 Log likelihood = -2492.1328
LR CHI2(22) = 2664.77 PROB > CHI2 = 0.0000 
Number of observations = 8687
* Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 10%
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mark. On the other hand, individuals who spend above
the poverty line but below GH2000 per annum (with
some borrowing to supplement their incomes) are only
able to reduce their likelihood of being poor by 88.2%
with any additional increase in expenditure relative to
those who spend above this limit. In instances where the
increased expenditure is on food, then this conclusion
holds given that individuals are now better resourced to
consume highly nutritious meals.
Poverty and household size
Studies by Anyanwu (2005), Bauman (1997), Elzaki et al
(2009), and Gardiner et al. (2006) have argued about the
diverse effects of household size on the severity of
poverty. Households with less than five individuals are
found to be 1260.9% likely to be poor with any additional
member relative to those with larger number of
individuals. It is observed that such smaller households
comprise mainly of parents and their children, who are
mostly not gainfully employed. Couples usually give birth
to a large number of children with the hope that these
children will take care of them in their old age, given the
absence of well-developed social security systems and
low savings (Anyanwu, 2005) in Ghana. Similarly,
households with between 5 and 15 individuals are found
to be 81.7% likely to be poor with any additional member
compared to those with a higher number of individuals.
Such large households are observed to comprise
children, other relatives (including in-laws), and non-
relatives. It is realized that as the household size
increases, the probability of an individual being poor
reduces, albeit significantly. The significant feature of such
large households is that most of the individuals are
employed in one or more jobs. As they do so, they relieve
the household head of the burden of having to take care
of everybody’s needs. Self-help spirits are motivated and
particularly in the Ghanaian society where it is ‘almost’ a
must to share ones riches, the working group supports in
providing the needs of all individuals. Hence, the
household head is saved from ‘hitting’ the poverty line.
This finding contradicts that of Bauman (1997) who
opines that such individuals rather keep their money to
themselves. It also goes contrary to that of Gardiner et al
(2006).
Poverty and level of education
Literature on the effect of education on poverty is at worst
difficult to count. Given that labour is the most valuable
asset of the poor, increasing their levels of education is
expected to reduce their poverty levels as well. A vicious
cycle of poverty emerges such that low levels of
education lead to increased poverty whiles increased
poverty leads to low levels of education (Anyanwu, 2005).
Due to the high opportunity cost of education, the poor
usually abstain from it in order to have enough time to
work for survival’s sake. This study shows that individuals
with at most junior high school education are more likely
to be poor by 161.3% relative to those with higher levels
of education. Anyanwu (2005) and Elzaki (2009) have
observed that individuals with primary or basic education
stood a higher risk of being poverty than those with
higher levels of education. On the other hand, holding a
vocational or teacher training certificate increased the
likelihood of being poor by 205.4% relative to those with
bachelor’s degrees or higher. This may seem impractical
but the obvious explanation for this in the Ghanaian
setting is that lower levels of education other than a
bachelor’s degree do not substantially lead to higher
income levels. However, most of these levels of education
are costly to attain and thus individuals spend more on
them only to receive meager salaries during employment.
The situation is even worse for diploma and certificate
holders; with about 254.3% likelihood of being poor
relative to those with bachelor’s degrees and/or higher
levels of education. Thus it may only be appropriate to
seek higher levels of education with at least a bachelor’s
degree as the terminal one, since all other lower levels do
not significantly help reduce poverty rates. This is what
Spence (1973) noted in his essay on “Job Market
Signaling”, when increased education does not translate
into higher wages especially when such levels of
education are attained at higher costs. This
notwithstanding, Olaniyan (2000) observed that the
education level of the household head was the single
most important determinant of household poverty.
Poverty and ecological zone of
individuals
The results of this study show that the location of an
individual matters for the severity of poverty in the
Ghanaian economy. Specifically, the study observes that
individuals in the coastal zone of Ghana increase their
likelihood of being poor by about 423.6% relative to those
in the savannah zone. Likewise, individuals in the forest
zone also stand the chance of increasing their probability
of being poor by 398.7% relative to those in the savannah
zone. As observed, individuals in the savannah zone of
Ghana are employed largely in wide-spread informal
activities whereas their counterparts in the coastal and
forest zones search for non-existent formal sector
employment. Thus, the dependency rate (free-riding) in
Ashesi Economics Lectures Series Journal 29 Volume 1, issue 1
EconJournal1-3-v2_Layout 1  03/04/2013  10:49  Page 29
the savannah zone seems very much less relative to other
zones as majority of individuals are engaged in some form
of largely informal employment. Also, the results are
evident from the fact that recent attention has shifted
largely towards the three northern regions in the savannah
zone of Ghana. This has been part of an effort to reduce
their levels of poverty at the expense of the coastal and
forest zones. Consequently, there has been a paradigm
shift of poverty from the savannah zone to the coastal and
forest zones.
Policy recommendations 
The results above give support to the fact that policy
interventions are necessary to reduce poverty levels in
Ghana. 
Given that female household heads are more likely to
be poor than their male counterparts, policy should seek
to provide females with enough funding to augment their
business capital. Banks should move towards extending
loans to female groups and individuals at low interest
rates to improve their businesses. Traders should be
encouraged to form associations in order to improve their
chances of securing loans from banks to revamp their
businesses. Also, to ease the burden on married couples,
there should be advisory services offered them with
regard to the advantages involved in pooling together
resources; in situations where both parties are employed. 
Another significant recommendation is for government
to increase the poverty alleviation campaign in all regions
of the economy, bringing an end to the over-
concentration on the three northern regions. There should
be a decentralization of the process to include all district,
municipal and metropolitan assemblies (DMMAs).
However, there should be strict monitoring of officials to
ensure that best practices are being followed. To achieve
this, local offices for poverty alleviation (LOFPA) should be
established in the DMMAs. The LOFPAs should have a
special mandate to effectively reduce poverty in their
localities and should also be accountable to their regional
head offices. To this end, there should be increased
research on the determinants of poverty in each district,
municipality and metropolis. Corporate bodies should
particularly be encouraged to support this process in the
communities they operate. There should also be
education on the need for individuals to engage in
secondary income earning activities aside of their primary
occupations. Thus, self-help spirits should be motivated.
To a larger extent, individuals should cut down on
expenditures that go into wants and other luxuries and try
as much to optimize their resource use. They should be
educated on taking advantage of dividend yielding
investment opportunities that will ensure a regular stream
of income rather than embarking on spending sprees with
their incomes.
Lastly, the government should seek to ensure that
majority of the country’s population attain university
education. Due to the rising cost of education beyond
that which individuals can afford, the government should
increase its subsidies to the sector or ultimately provide
free education at the university first degree level (at least).
By this strategy, most students will work their way up to
the University just to enjoy the free education. Eventually,
the state benefits from the human capacity it has been
able to train. However, to achieve this, there should be a
restructuring of the educational system to including
courses that are ‘useful’ to the country so that graduates
will duly be gainfully employed. Aside of improving the
livelihoods of individuals, this will also help the economy
to grow. 
Conclusion
This paper studied the incidence of poverty in Ghana
using GLSS (2008) data covering 8,687 individuals. The
results showed that by 2006 the proportion of individuals
living below the poverty line stood at 0.77. To worsen the
situation, these individuals are very much distant (poverty
gap) from the poverty line by 0.75 on a scale of 0 to 1. In
addition, the core poor population is about 0.74 in
proportion to the total number of poor people. This shows
that majority of the people still live in poverty. Thus,
poverty alleviation measures implemented since the
inception of the millennium development goals have
achieved little success. What has basically been done is a
‘switching’ of poverty from the savannah zone to the
coastal and forest zones without seeking to reduce the
severity of poverty in general across the country.
In conclusion, policy should seek to drive the wheels of
poverty alleviation faster than it is being done. 
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Abstract
Political stability is often cited as a key determinant of
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) although little
research that identifies the factors that ensure
political stability in SSA is available. A pertinent
determinant of political stability in SSA may be press
freedom since on one hand, the press can contribute
to political stability by keeping the electorate
informed thereby keeping a check on graft, fraud,
embezzlement and other corrupt practices of
government officials. On the other hand, however, the
press can be manipulated to generate political
instability by misinforming the public so the exact
relationship between press freedom and political
stability in SSA is ex ante unclear. By investigating
the determinants of political stability and accounting
for possible of endogeneity bias, this paper (i) isolates
the most pertinent variables that affect political
stability in Sub-Saharan Africa and (ii) investigates to
what extent press freedom mitigates or worsens the
incidence of political instability in the SSA region. A
panel of 31 SSA countries from 1984–2007 is used in
static and dynamic panel data frameworks to
investigate the determinants of political stability and
to verify the relationship between media freedom and
political stability in SSA. Important determinants of
political stability are found to be mainly related to
economic performance, macroeconomic policies,
unemployment the level of education and regime
type. Preliminary results also suggest that media
freedom may be a vital determinant of political
stability in SSA although less so than economic,
political and social factors. Ongoing estimations
suggest elasticities of political stability with respect to 
media freedom calculated at different values of media
freedom are nonzero. The research result should help
guide policy makers in the different nation states of
SSA in drafting pragmatic media and economic
policies that will promote political stability in their
respective countries.
Key words: Press Freedom, Political Instability, Panel
Data, Elasticity, Sub-Saharan Africa
Introduction
Considered a perennially unstable region with minuscule
growth prospects and often plagued by powerful
influences from within and without and by its own inherent
demons, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) seems more stable
recently and is growing (Armah, 2009). Reasons for this
growth have been attributed to good governance and
political stability (Armah, 2009). Note that Political stability
as defined here reflects good governance. It represents
legislative strength as well as the ruling government’s
popularity, its ability to carry out its declared programs
and its ability to stay in office. This definition of political
stability does not however reflect catastrophic events,
including wars.
We concede that there remains some debate about
both the theoretical validity and empirical robustness of
the political stability-growth claim although it has been
touted by influential leaders such as current US president
Barack Obama and former British premier Gordon Brown.
For proponents of the conditionality theory that economic
prosperity is predicated on political stability however, it
seems priceless to find answers to questions like (i) what
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are the pertinent determinants of political stability
specifically in SSA, (ii) how sensitive is political stability to
changes in these factors and (iii) how distinct are these
factors from causalities of political stability on the larger
global scale? 
Ironically, although the statistical relevance of a myriad
of factors believed to stimulate political stability have been
investigated on a global scale (e.g. poor economic
performance, regime type, tribalism, and inequality etc)1,
little attention has been paid to formulating an empirical
model to verify the determinants of political stability
specifically in SSA. Mbaku (1989) and Seifu (2009) are,
however, notable exceptions. Further in spite of the
considerable albeit old literature that exists on the
theoretical underpinnings of the media freedom-political
stability link (See for example Ogbondah (1994)) very little
empirical verification of the media freedom-political
stability link has yet been undertaken. 
We argue that for SSA empirical justification of the free
press-political stability link is urgently needed as the
relationship is ex-ante indeterminate and is essentially an
empirical question. On one hand, the press can
contribute to political stability by informing the electorate
thereby keeping a check on graft and corrupt practices of
government officials. On the other hand, however, the
press can be manipulated to generate political instability
by misinforming the public. Even if we knew that press
freedom affects political stability we still need to know by
how much press freedom (or the lack of it) stimulates
(hurts) political stability. 
By formalizing an empirical model to isolate the
determinants of political stability, and accounting for
possible endogeneity bias between the indices of political
stability and press freedom, this paper contributes to the
literature by investigating the factors that determine
political stability in Sub-Saharan Africa and in particular to
what extent press freedom mitigates or worsens the
incidence of political instability in the Sub-Saharan African
region. 
A panel of 31 SSA countries from 1984–2007 is used
in both a static and a dynamic panel data framework to
investigate the relationship between media freedom and
political stability in SSA. Other significant determinants of
political stability are also identified. Preliminary results
suggest that the most important determinants of political
stability are economic in nature although media freedom
is also an important determinant of political stability in
SSA because elasticities of political stability with respect
to media freedom calculated at different values of media
freedom are nonzero and increase with increasing
freedom of the press. The research result should help
guide policy makers in the different nation states of SSA
in drafting pragmatic media and development policies that
will promote political stability in their respective countries.
Literature review
The last two decades of the twentieth century were
marked globally by what Huttington (1991) labeled the
“third wave” of democratization. This “wave” did not leave
SSA untouched. In West Africa for example decades old
military regimes (e.g. Ghana, Benin, Niger and Mali) were
replaced by democratically elected governments even
though the electoral processes tended not to be free from
some manipulation aimed at advantaging incumbents.
Undoubtedly military regimes in SSA had come to
symbolize powerfully the chronic political instability that
bedeviled developing polities in the post colonial era. 
Understanding the nature, causes and consequences
of political instability in SSA has attracted the attention of
both developed and developing country scholars in
contemporary times. Fosu (1992) examined the impact of
political instability on the economic growth of 31 SSA
countries from 1960 to 1986. He concluded that on
average political instability undermines economic growth.
Nkrurunziza and Bates (2003), Gyimah-Brempong and
Tynor (1999) concern themselves as well with the inverse
link between political instability and economic growth. In a
particularly influential work Collier and Hoeffler (1998;
2000/2003) through econometric analysis conclude that
primary resource dependence (operationalized as primary
commodity exports as a percentage of GDP) is correlated
with a higher risk of conflict. In this view the opportunity
for economic advantage is a powerful motivation for
armed conflict and hence a strong driver for political
instability in developing polities. This Collier-Hoeffler
construal for explicating the cause of political instability
has however been critiqued by some scholars who
questioned its methodological approach (Sambanis 2002;
de Soysa 2002; Ross 2004a) while other academics like
Aning and Hutchful (2004) while pointing out its
reductionist bent insist on a broad and sophisticated
political economy analysis of the causes of contemporary
conflicts and by extension political instability. 
The rents framework in all its variants (Bates, 1981;
Frimpong-Ansah, 1991; Krueger, 1974; Lal, 1984) posits
essentially to borrow Mbaku’s (1989:65) words “that rent-
seeking on the part of heterogeneous groups of political
entrepreneurs is responsible for the political instability in
African governments.” In other words the causes of
political instability in Africa lie in state intervention in the
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market and the attempt by political elites to profit from
this. State incapacity understood to mean broadly the
inability of the state to perform its developmental,
bureaucratic and regulatory functions is considered by
some scholars (Sobek, 2010; DeRouen et al) as a key
determinant of political instability. Sobek (2010:269)
captures the thinking of such scholars when he asserts
that “in the most general sense, state capacity affects the
opportunity of groups to engage in actions against the
state.” In a somewhat unique Seifu (2009) concludes that
colonial heritage (whether the African Country was
colonized by England, France, Portugal, Italy or Spain)
and income disparity were the key determinants of regime
survival in SSA.
The foundations of press freedom and its link to
political stability have also been extensively discussed in
the literature (Novel, 2006; UNESCO, 2008; Soola, 2009;
Ogbondah, 1994; Egorov, Guriev and Sonin, 2006).
However, surprising though it may seem, empirical
validation on the political stability-media freedom is scarce
in the literature. Even worse, SSA-specific empirical
research on the Press freedom and political stability link is
non-existent. We therefore seek in this paper to
contribute to the empirical literature on the determinants
of political stability in SSA although we do put particular
focus on investigating the role of press freedom if any in
the attainment of stability. 
As democratic governance becomes the norm in SSA,
media freedom, which is seen as crucial in promoting
political participation and accountability, has taken on
added significance. Media freedom however seems to
present a Janus-faced paradox in relation to political
stability in SSA. The role of Radio Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines (RTLMC) in the Rwandan genocide of April-
June 1994 provides an empirical, contemporary, reflection
of this paradox. The RTMLC spurred on the massacre of
Tutsis and moderate Hutus. More recently, Zimbabwe has
emerged as a bastion of press control in SSA. Other
countries, for example Ghana, have peculiar laws that
allows the government to charge journalists with “causing
fear and panic”
Comeforo (2010:219) is on point when he states that
“to serve its democratizing function, conventional wisdom
argues that the media must be objective and
independent, and not merely a megaphone for powerful
interests.”  In order words media freedom can be made to
serve other narrow interests which may not be necessarily
coterminous with the public order and welfare. For
developing polities this can pose real threats to political
stability. Chomsky and Herman (2008) present a model in
which they sketch out the processes by which elite
interests manipulate the media in the global North. Does
media freedom in developing countries portend such a
possibility as posited by Chomsky and Herman? If so the
implications for political stability in developing countries
ceases to be benignly magnanimous and should be
decomposed more carefully. Clearly then the exact
relationship between political stability and media freedom
in SSA is ex ante unclear. In this work, aside of confirming
the most pertinent determinants of political stability in
SSA, we seek to make some meaning of the crucial
media-political stability link in a democratizing SSA.
Theory, empirical model, methods
and data
Theoretical relationship between media freedom
and political stability
Ogbondah (1994) highlights a possible route through
which a free press can theoretically inhibit political stability
in SSA. According to him “African leaders argue that
given SSA’s subservient position in the global economic
system, a deleterious colonial legacy and the fragility of
institutions in newly independent SSA countries, a free
press as pertains in the USA and UK can too easily lead
to instability of government to function and to internal
chaos (Aggarwala, 1977, Mboya 1970 and Sommerlad,
1966).” The argument that free press is inimical to stability
emphasizes the harsh reality that since SSA has low
levels of literacy and education suggest that even if SSA
residents did get information from different sources, they
may not be able to adequately process the information to
arrive at a reasonable consensus. The confusion that
emanates from a lack of comprehension can fuel chaos
leading to political agitation and potential conflict.
Therefore since SSA residents can be manipulated by the
press (as happened in Rwanda in the 1990s), press
control is not only potentially beneficial for stability, it is
necessary to ensure political stability and economic
development in SSA.
A more pragmatic view of the relationship between
media freedom and political stability may be that the
former positively stimulates the latter implying press
freedom is an essential ingredient for political stability on
the sub-continent. A free press keeps the electorate
informed by revealing information on and thus keeping a
check on graft, fraud, theft, bribery, embezzlement,
smuggling and other corrupt practices of government
officials. Since corruption and graft have been identified
as especially inimical to economic growth, reduction in
corruption that results from freeing the press may
encourage political stability since a good performing
economy will likely discourage political insurrection which
results in political instability.
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Model
Although we are especially interested in the effect of
Media Freedom (used interchangeably here to mean
Freedom of the Press) on Political Stability in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), we first try to determine in a holistic
manner the determinants of political stability. We employ a
modified version of Blanco and Grier’s (2010) empirical
model used to investigate the determinants of political
stability in Latin America. We modified their model by
introducing some key variables likely to be pertinent in
Sub-Saharan Africa. We acknowledge that a few variables
originally employed in Blanco and Grier’s (2010) empirical
model are not included in our model because of lack of
data for the respective SSA countries. 
Following Blanco and Grier’s (2010), we will discuss
the mechanism by which the different variables influence
political stability by first aggregating these variables into
broad groups then focusing on each variable one at a
time in each of the broad groups of variables. Blanco and
Grier’s (2010) identified the broad groups of variables
affecting Political Stability in Latin America as (A) regime
type, Factionalism and Regime Duration (B)
Neighbourhood Instability, (C) Inequality (D) Socio-
demographic Conditions and (E) Macroeconomic factors.
Subject to data availability we propose an empirical model
such as in (1) 
PSit = δ + δ PFit + θ X + μit (1)
Where Political Stability (PS) is the dependent variable, PF
is Press Freedom, X is a vector of explanatory variables
apart from Press Freedom and μit is an iid error term with
a zero mean and a constant variance. Note that ignoring
the details of what variables are in the broad groups for
now, the broad groups of determining variables include (a)
Press Freedom (b) Regime type (c) Different Measures of
Inequality (d) Socio-Demographic Variables (e) General
Economic Performance Factors (f) Macroeconomic
factors (g) Level of agricultural participation in the
economy and (h) Other Relevant Variables in the SSA
Context. 
The next section provide details of what variables are in
each group and briefly describe how and in which
direction each of these variables are related to Political
Stability while the data section will expand on the
sources, frequency and construction of the variables used
in the study.
a. Media freedom and political stability 
Media freedom or Free Press (FP) mitigates the negative
effects of corruption on political stability and may actually
promote stability by offering avenues for discourse and
calling attention to potentially volatile issues before they
blow up Ogbondah (1994). However, as Mbaku (1989)
argues the press can also be manipulated to incite
instability. Media freedom is expected to positively affect
stability although the sign of the relationship between
media freedom and political stability is really an empirical
question. 
b. Regime type
According to Blanco and Grier’s (2010), the effect of
regime type, democracy (DEMOCRACY) or autocracy, on
political stability has enjoyed significant attention in the
literature (see for example, Rummel (1995), Auvinen
(1997), Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Feng (1997)).
Although some researchers, for example Schatzman
(2005) have found mixed results with regards to the
relationship between democracy and political stability, the
overarching consensus appears that democracy should
positively influence stability because it allows a broad
section of the population to participate in the political
process (Tulchin and Brown 2002; Ellingsen, 2000; Parsa,
2003 and Blanco and Grier, 2010).
c. Inequality 
A highly unequal distribution of income will likely enhance
social discontent, since individuals will perceive that
income is unfairly distributed, leading to agitation and
instability (Blanco and Grier’s, 2010; Perotti, 1996;
Auvinen and Nafziger, 2002; Alesina and Perotti, 1996;
Perotti 1996; and Odedokun and Round, 2001).
Inequality is expected to be negatively related to stability.
d. Socio-demographic variables
The socio-demographic variables used in this study
include the levels of educational attainment (PRIM) and
urbanization (URBAN) of the population. Anderson (2003)
explains that false beliefs as documented by Hobbes can
cloud the judgment of an uneducated person and incite
him into taking destabilizing action without properly
accounting for the potential costs. Education is expected
to be positively correlated to stability. In terms of
urbanization there is little consensus about its effect on
political stability. While Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find a
positive urbanization-stability link, Auvinen (1997) and
Annett (2001) find a negative relationship.
e. General economic performance factors
The variables categorized under economic performance
include Economic Growth (GROWTH), and
Unemployment (UNEMPLOY). Needless to say these
factors are likely related to each other by some latent
time-invariant factor that affects political stability and all
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three of these variables concurrently. Low economic grow
will lead to insurrection especially when income levels are
low and unemployment is high (Blanco and Grier, 2010;
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Grossman (1991)).
f. Macroeconomic factors
The main macroeconomic variables considered were (i) A
measure of Economic Policy (POLICY) as described in
Burnside and dollar (2000), (ii) Investment as a share of
GDP (INVEST_GDP) and (iii) Foreign Aid (AID). It is
expected that policies and investment will both promote
stability but the effect of foreign aid on political stability is
ambiguous. On the one hand aid and spur growth which
encourages stability but on the other and aid can elicit
rent-seeking behaviour that can be particularly de-
stabilizing.
g. Other relevant variables 
Other variables relevant in the SSA context include
dummies respectively for French colonial heritage
(D_FRA_COLONY) and English (D_ENG_COLONY)
colonial heritage and a proxy for the effect of extensive
practice of traditional agriculture on stability (AFRIC LF).
Its ex ante unclear what the signs of the relationships
between the colonial legacy variables and political stability
will be. However since SSA had more than two colonial
asters it’s possible to put in both dummies simultaneously
or one dummy after the other. Mbaku (1989) argues that
countries with a large percentage of the  labor force
engaged in agriculture can easily be de-stabilized
because the government tends to transfer rents from
agriculture without due compensation to traditional
agricultural practitioners. In a country with a large number
of traditional agricultural practitioners, therefore, stability
will be especially elusive. Following Mbaku (1989) we
employ the percentage of the labor force engaged in
agriculture to capture such effects in the empirical model
of political stability.
Methods
Note that the empirical methodology employed attempts
to accounts for problems of mis-specification resulting
either from a non-constant error variance
(heteroskedasticity) or from endogeneity bias that can be
caused by (i) by persistence in the dependent variable (ii)
by the confounding effect of an omitted variable that
concurrently affects the dependent and some of the
independent variables or by (iii) unobserved time constant
country-specific effects. We do however concede the
small sample size and a lack of sufficiently strong and
exogenous instruments prevented an exhaustive
treatment of endogeneity. Further, difficulty in obtaining
data for some pertinent model variables implies that there
is likely omitted variable bias still present. The inter-related
nature of the correlations between variables also implies
that signs of such bias are difficult to establish. Finally
note that variables that were insignificant but did not
reduce the R-square when they were excluded from the
model were not included in the regressions reported in
the results section. Examples of such variables include (a)
measurements of inequality (such as the poverty head
count ratio, and the portion of the population earning
20% of national income) and (b) a measure of
bureaucratic quality
Data
The press freedom data are from Freedom House
International while the political stability data are from the
Political Research Service (PRS). Although some of the
dummy variables use in the paper, for example, Colonial
Legacy are constructed by the author,  the bulk of the of
the data on the explanatory valuables such as the growth
data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of
the World Bank, the Penn World Tables, and the World
Banks’ Africa Database CD. The data range from 1984 to
2007 and cover six four-year periods (i.e. 1984–1987 to
2004–2007). 
To avoid possible multicollinearity problems due to the
likely high correlation between the independent variables,
a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables
developed and is presented in Table 1. It is clear from
Table 1, that the pair wise correlations are not too high or
lower than one, so multicollinearity is not likely to a serious
problem. Table 2 presents definitions and descriptive
statistics of the data including means, standard
deviations, minima and maxima. Figures 1 and 2 show
that while press freedom (F) appears to be positively
related to political stability in a stable country like Ghana, it
is negatively related to political stability in an unstable
country like Somalia. The ambiguity in the empirical
relationship between PS and media freedom (PF) is
obviously an important motivation for the research. Note
that the Media Freedom variable (FP) as used in this
research is on a 1–3 scale where 1 represents not free, 2
is partly free and 3 is free. The data was obtained from
Freedom house and only considers print but not
electronic media. 
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that Political Stability is
very much a recent phenomenon because stability has
improve substantially for both stable and unstable
countries while Figures 5 and 6 displays the political
stability values for a set of SSA countries for two different
time periods; an older period 1994–1999 and the more
recent 2004–2007 period. For this group of SSA
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countries political stability situation is relatively unchanged
over time despite heterogeneity in the data among
countries.
Discussion of results
The empirical model in (1) enables us to identify the
important determinants of political stability in SSA and to
quantify the response of political stability to changes in
these factors. We acknowledge the apparent arbitrariness
in the (0–12) political stability PS scale. However
numerous studies, for example, (Armah, 2009) have used
this PS scale from the ICRG’s PRS dataset to quantify
political stability so we regard a positive marginal effect as
indicative of positive relationship between political stability
the relevant variable. 
The main results of the analysis are presented in Table 3.
The different columns of Table 1 display results from
different variants of estimation of (1) where (except for
column 1) result are corrected for possible serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity. Column 1 contains
OLS results of the basic model where the BD (2000)
AIDPOL interaction variable and the agricultural
participation (AGRIC_LF) variables are not included in the
model. Column 2 contains both the AIDPOL and
AGRIC_LF variables. To account for possible endogeneity
due to feedback from free press to political stability we lag
the FP variable one period. Column 3 contains all the
variables in column 2 but with lag FP replacing FP. Fixed
effect estimation is employed to account for potential
unobserved time constant country–specific effect
endogeneity in a static panel data framework with the
results presented in Column 4 of Table 3. Finally the
results of one step Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic
panel estimation are presented in column 5. 
Of the different results presented, Column 3 of Table 2
is chosen as the model of choice because it is a more
complete model with a high R-square as well as
reasonable signs and strong statistical significance of
variables. In addition, the significant lag which indicates
that it takes time for media freedom to affect political
stability is reasonable given that the lag eliminates
endogeneity due to feedback from PF since PFt-1 is pre-
determined in (1). We place less faith in the fixed effects
and dynamic panel data models because of the small size
and potentially small variations in the variables over time. 
From column 3 of Table 3, it is clear that the most
important determinants o political stability in SSA are
economic in nature because investment, growth and
economic policy are all significantly related to political
stability at conventional significance levels as are
urbanization, democracy and education. The signs of
these variables are consistent with expectations since
Blanco and Grier (2010) finds similar results for Latin
America. Perhaps unsurprisingly, unemployment is
strongly negatively correlated with political stability
indicating that a considerable portion of instability in SSA
may be due to lack of job opportunities.
Since the signs of some the variables that are not
significant (French and English colonial legacies
respectively) are difficult to guess ex ante we will not dwell
on them. However it is notable that the portion of the
labor force engaged in Agric is positive but the sign of aid
and its interaction with policy are negative indicating that
rent seeking through aid is destabilizing.
With regards, to media freedom, Column 3 of Table 3
shows that it is positively and significantly related to
Political Stability in SSA at the 95% confidence level
because the coefficient of PF (0.6) is positive with a p-
value of 0.05. However to gauge the magnitude response
we calculate elasticities of political stability at the three
different levels of media freedom (1, 2 and 3) and obtain
elasticities of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. Although these
values are less than one (inelastic) which indicates that
political stability is not very responsive to changes in
media freedom, the fact that the elasticity increases as we
move from a shackled press (FP =1) to a free press (FP = 3)
provided some comfort that increasing freedoms for the
press bodes well for political stability in SSA.
Conclusion and recommendations
The paper set out (i) to determine pertinent determinants
of political stability specifically in SSA, (ii) to find out how
sensitive is political stability to changes in these factors
and (iii) how distinct are these factors from causalities of
political stability on the larger global scale? From the
results above, we conclude that press freedom,
investment, growth and economic policy are all
significantly related to political stability at conventional
significance levels as are urbanization, democracy,
education and unemployment. In particular a free press is
supportive of political stability in SSA because the
elasticity of political stability with respect to press freedom
is non-zero and increasing in press freedom. Furthermore
the variables identified as promoting press freedom are
mostly economic in nature and not very different from the
factors that promote political stability in other parts of the
world for example Latin America. The results clearly
indicate that policy makers in SSA should put economic
development even higher on the Agenda than it is now
because it can actually reduce discontent and generate
stability but media freedom is also important for reducing
corruption. SSA government should invest in educating
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the labor force, construct good roads, guarantee stable
power, build shipping ports to reduce transport costs,
endeavour to reduce the cost of borrowing and guarantee
press freedom in order to promote economic
development which is priority number one. A strong
economy will also support political stability. Further
research should more carefully account for different
sources of endogeneity and acquire data on variables like
rent seeking, corruption, tribalism, religious composition,
regime duration, inequality and neighbourhood instability
in order to define a more complete model of political
stability. The interactions between variables like
democracy, press freedom, economic policy and
urbanization should also be more carefully assessed in
order to obtain a more robust model of the determinants
of political stability in SSA.
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Appendix 1
Figure 1 Political stability vs press freedom for
Ghana (stable country), 1984–2007
Figure 2 Political stability vs press freedom for
Liberia (unstable country), 1984–2007
Note: Thereappears to be a negative relationship between
Press Freedom (PF) and Political Stability (PS)
Data Source: PS is from ICRGs PRS dataset while PF is
from Freedom of the Word’s Index
Figure 3 Political stability for the most stable SSA
countries, 1984–2007
Figure 4 Political stability for the least stable SSA
countries, 1984–2007
Figure 5 Political stability for SSA countries, 
1984–2007
Figure 6 Political stability for SSA countries, 
1996–1999
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables
Variable definition Mean Maximum Source of data, index or
(expected sign of correlation with PS) (standard deviation) (Minimum) Constructed variable
Political Stability (PS) 6.87 ICRG's Political Research
[NOT APPLICABLE] (0.17) (1.7) Service Database
Press Freedom (PF) 1.46 3 Freedom House's
( + ) (0.04) (0.0) Press Freedom Index
Investment /GDP (INVEST_GDP) 0.42 15.11 World bank's Africa Database
(+) (0.23) (10.01) CD
Economic Growth (GROWTH) 0.4 32.13 World bank's Africa Database
(+) (0.345) (-24.8) CD
Economic Policy (POLICY) 0.46 2.3 Constructed variable
(+) (0.05) (1.48) Following Sachs and Warner
Urban Dwellers/ Total Population (URBANIZATION) 32.72 83.75 World Bank Data
(Ambiguous) (1.12) (5.32)
Regime Type (DEMOCRACY) 0.47 1 Dummy (Constructed variable)
(+) (0.03) (0.0)
Education (PRIM) 6.18 8 World Development Indicators
(+) (0.05) (4)
Foreign Aid/ GDP (AID) 0.2 1.7 OECD'S DAC
(Ambiguous) (0.01) (0) Database
French Colonial Legacy (D_COLONY_FR) 0.4 1 Dummy (Constructed variable)
(Ambiguous) (0.04) (0)
English Colonial Legacy (D_COLONY_ENG) 0.45 1 Dummy (Constructed variable)
(Ambiguous) (0.04) (0)
Unemployment (UNEMPLOY) 1.64 26.4 World bank Data
(-) (0.23) (0)
Poverty Headcount at NationalPov line (POV _HDCOUNT) 3.7 36.5 World Bank Data
(-) (0.074) (0)
Bureaucratic Quality (BUR_QUAL) 1.48 0 ICRG's Political Research
(-) (0.074) (4) Service Database
Portion of GDP due to top 2 deciles (INC_SHAREHIGH) 2.77 23.11 World bank Data
(-) (0.35) (0)
Portion of GDP due to lowest 2 deciles (INC_SHARELOW) 0.632848462 4.7 World bank Data
(+) (0.07) (0)
Portion of Population employed in Agric (AGRIC_LF) 13.36 24.18 World bank Data
(Ambiguous) (0.42) (1)
Export Instability Index (EXINST) 0.543330852 4.5 Constructed variable
(-) (0.05) (-0.11)
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix of Selected Explanatory Variables
Invest Urbanisation
PS PF DP Growth Policy On DEM PRIM
PS 1
PF 0.071254002 1
INVEST_GDP 0.360827594 0.06512653 1
GROWTH 0.417982118 -0.00605501 0.511575774 1
POLICY 0.102430108 -0.095021643 0.20404438 0.031383221 1
URBANIZATION 0.036573511 0.122513331 -0.049783999 0.053662995 0.06309219 1
DEM 0.473470011 0.101461486 0.199203085 0.298355507 0.037652795 -0.027932282 1
PRIM -0.046756247 0.122059957 -0.012787897 0.011653995 -0.133403665 -0.138049959 -0.071439922 1
AID -0.119797059 0.01522462 0.041914465 0.034350788 0.124688498 -0.184979771 -0.198881348 0.044244121
D_COLONY_FR 0.101066872 -0.037964727 0.078347558 0.099907407 -0.043452262 -0.046632778 0.225244762 -0.023377945
D_COLONY_ENG -0.074881712 0.136335678 0.031306094 -0.043187569 0.140682041 0.015431344 -0.141446639 0.28293425
UNEMPLOY -0.011679515 0.398062043 -0.030091506 -0.026398982 0.066512828 0.310463843 0.098812822 0.162046543
POV _HDCOUNT 0.046443073 0.137663682 0.001357355 -0.028419013 -0.074112184 -0.117566084 0.119037498 0.033672673
DEM_ACC 0.332915802 0.051338906 0.11017717 0.111089109 0.05408702 0.038521117 0.495177472 -0.107302186
BUR_QUAL 0.066859865 0.031318275 0.033213891 0.054519944 0.020052619 0.014538427 0.12508859 -0.14075447
INC_SHAREHIGH 0.122623452 0.089680955 0.03814664 0.036356978 0.065647761 -0.051711244 0.110233886 -0.170537338
INC_SHARELOW 0.133881135 0.103303106 0.057061678 0.062742724 0.012901429 -0.117522046 0.097815223 -0.028229097
Note: The SSA countries in the analysis include:: Angola, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Congo, Congo DR, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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-0.061569565 -0.125530379 0.203170033 1
 -0.071076926 -0.044813731 0.123662258 0.044223808 1
-0.148712884 0.197593451 -0.16996188 -0.085447646 0.009320233 1
0.078653131 0.155876803 -0.001977062 0.002362187 -0.060338529 0.319288446 1
-0.096756045 0.23462236 -0.195662318 -0.065336389 0.278355332 0.049978483 0.090325815 1
-0.016187936 0.149293799 -0.046115529 -0.026515215 0.291978946 0.017367208 0.009683026 0.745227345 1
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Table 3: Growth regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS POLS FE DYNAMIC
NO AIDPOL AGRIC LF LAGGED FP NO LAG AB 1 Step
PF 0.4 0.52 0.6 0.57 0.8
(1.6)* (1.9)** (1.95)** (1.56) (1.21)
INVEST_GDP 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.12
(2.2)** (1.84)* (1.56) (1.87)* (1.34)
GROWTH 0.1 1 0.12 1 0.14
(2.6)** (3.08)** (2.73)** (3.05)*** (2.82)**
POLICY 0.4 0.6 0.54 0.5 0.42
(1.8)* (1.94)** (1.87)* (1.19) (0.7)
URBAN 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(2.2)** (1.89)* (1.05) (0.52) (0.04)
DEMOCRACY 1.9 1.84 1.5 1.8 -8
(6.0)*** (6.10)*** (4.26)*** (4.82)*** (1.310
EDUCATION 0.8 0.7 0.72 -0.67 0
(8.0)*** (5.40)*** (5.15)*** (-0.76) 0
AID -0.4 -0.3 -0.51 -1.6 -2.3
(-0.6) (-0.45) (-0.65) (-1.46) (-1.25)
D_FRA_COLONY -0.4 -0.003 0.04 -0.54 -0.5
(-1.0) (-0.01) (0.12) (0.87) (-0.64)
AIDPOL -0.4 -0.8 -0.85 -1.3
(-0.43) (-0.63) (-0.68) (-0.52)
D_ENG_COLONY (-0.5)
(-1.2)
UNEMPLOY -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -1 0.02
(-2.2)** (-3.27)*** (-2.3)** (-1.95)** (0.12)
AGRIC LF 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
(1.13) (1.16) (0.3) (0.03)
LAGGED PS 0.5
(2.78)
Observations 184 186 155 186 124
R-Square (Overall) 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.3
Note. Errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the robust
estimations. Outliers were deleted in each regression. Student t-statistics in parentheses.*
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*** significant at 1%***
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Abstract
This paper assesses the usefulness of risk hedging
on futures markets for a cocoa exporter subject to
concurrent price and output (revenue) risks. The
analysis is conducted for Ghana, the world’s second
largest exporter of cocoa beans. Using cocoa export
revenue data, the cocoa exporter’s utility
maximization problem (UMP) is solved using a
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function due to Nelson and Escalante (2004) which
displays risk vulnerability. Risk vulnerability is the
most natural restriction on preferences (Gollier and
Pratt, 1996). Simulation results from solving the UMP
indicate that as a result of production risk, optimal
revenue hedge ratios are much smaller than optimal
price risk hedge ratios for reasonable values of the
risk parameter. When transaction costs are
incorporated into the hedger’s UMP, optimal revenue
hedge ratios decline further although they remain
positive. The findings indicate that limited use of the
futures market is optimal for Ghana because it
improves cocoa exporter utility relative to the
unhedged position. These results should provide
valuable information to policy makers in Ghana and
other cocoa producing countries because they
confirm that revenue risk hedging is a viable risk
management alternative even when transaction costs
are accounted for in the UMP of the hedger. 
Key words: Transaction costs, risk management,
cocoa, hedge ratio, risk vulnerability.
JEL Classification: MO; N27; Q13; Q14; and Q17
Introduction
Cocoa exporting Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
governments typically depend heavily on cocoa export
revenue to finance development projects, exposing them
to export revenue risk (Borenstein, Jeane and Sandri,
2009 and Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako and Grynberg,
2007). Export revenue variability emanating from either
export price or production uncertainty can lead to
undesirable consequences for sovereign exporters overly
dependent on export revenue (Newbery and Stiglitz,
1981; Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako and Grynberg, 2007).
For instance, export revenue risk can increase the
likelihood of default on sovereign debt and also lead to
macroeconomic instability in export revenue-dependent
SSA countries (Malone, 2005). 
This paper focuses on the export revenue risk problem
facing Ghana, the second largest cocoa exporter in the
world where revenue risk is understood to comprise of
both price and output risks. Ghana is chosen for analysis
because it is somewhat typical of the cocoa exporting
SSA countries and relies heavily on cocoa export revenue:
cocoa provides nearly thirty percent of Ghana’s export
revenue (Pinnamang Tutu and Armah, 2011).
Export revenue risk has assumed great importance
recently because non-market strategies including buffer
stocks, buffer funds and commodity agreements
designed to minimize commodity revenue risk have failed
(Borenstein, Jeane and Sandri, 2009 and Larson,
Anderson and Verangis, 2004). Further, because of the
recent efforts by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
liberalize markets and foster competition in world
markets, risk management methods such as the cocoa
agreements and buffer stocks are not likely to be
encouraged in the future (Lence, 2009; Borenstein, Jeane
and Sandri, 2009). As an alternative, market-based risk
5 •Will hedging joint cocoa price
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management strategies including hedging may be used
to manage export revenue risk.
Should marketing boards of cocoa revenue-dependent
SSA countries such as Ghana use the futures markets to
mitigate price and output (revenue) risks? Will futures
hedging of revenue risk increase exporter’s welfare relative
to the unhedged position? How large should optimal
hedge ratios be especially after accounting for transaction
costs which have been shown in prior research to affect
their attractiveness? Answers to these questions are
potentially of value to policy makers as they provide
information on the effectiveness of futures markets in
hedging revenue risk.
We should clarify right at the onset that Ghana is
slightly different from other cocoa producing West African
countries (La Cote d’Ivoire or CIV, Togo, Cameroon,
Nigeria and Uganda) in the sense that it produces the
world’s best quality cocoa and thus enjoys a significant
quality premium but the genetic makeup of Ghana’s
cocoa does not differ much from the rest of West African
cocoa. At the moment Ghana sells all it cocoa mainly to
Europe by means of forward contracts. Granted that the
high quality premium may augment the utility of Ghana as
a cocoa exporter significantly enough to reduce Ghana’s
opportunity cost of not hedging to miniscule levels, if
Ghana is sufficiently risk averse, a case could still be
made for hedging revenue risk if the variations in output
and price are substantive.
In a well-known paper, Rolfo (1980) analysed the Utility
Maximization Problem (UMP) facing a cocoa exporting
country exposed to simultaneous price and production
(revenue) risk. The cocoa industry was selected for
analysis because it is plagued with production uncertainty
and risk (Rolfo, 1980). Rolfo focused on SSA’s major
cocoa exporters: Ghana, La Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), and
Nigeria that together account for nearly seventy percent
of world production and depend to varying degrees on
cocoa export revenues to fund development (Gibson,
2007).
Rolfo’s problem formulation described a sovereign
cocoa exporter exposed to concurrent price and
production risk taking a pre-harvest (September) position
in the futures market to establish a price at harvest
(March). In the absence of production risk, a traditional
recommendation of protecting a long position in a
physical market involves taking a short position of equal
size in the futures market (Hieronymus, 1971; Rolfo,
1980). Given production risk, Rolfo (1980) finds limited or
no use of the futures markets is superior to a full hedge. 
While Rolfo’s analysis is highly informative, his findings
may be limited in several dimensions. For example, since
his data ran from 1956 to 1976, the results are dated and
may no longer be relevant for current hedging decisions.
In particular, fundamental changes have occurred in
cocoa markets since Rolfo’s work. Consider Figures 1
and 2 which respectively provide plots of futures and
subsequent spot prices (cash price), and variance of
futures prices for cocoa from 1960 to 2008. Clear
evidence emerges of a structural break in futures and
spot prices, and in the variance of futures prices. The
earlier period was characterized by lower and less
variable prices, and by a closer relationship between
futures and spot prices. Statistical evidence of a structural
break in the variance of futures prices is presented in
Table 1 which displays results of the Miller Jackknife test,
a non-parametric test of structural change in the variance
that does not assume equal medians. From Table 1, the
null hypothesis that the ratio of the variances of futures
price before and after 1978 is unity is strongly rejected at
5 % significance level. Since optimal hedge ratios are
respectively influenced either by changes in the
correlation between cash and futures prices or by
changes in the variance of the futures price (over time),
the structural change in 1978 indicates a need to
reassess the cocoa exporter’s hedging decisions. More
importantly, Rolfo’s analysis ignores transaction costs.
Mattos, Garcia and Nelson (2008) demonstrate that when
transaction costs are considered when solving the utility
maximization problem of an agent, optimal hedge ratios
may change considerably.
Here we re-investigate the revenue risk problem facing
Ghana, the cocoa exporter, incorporating transaction
costs and using more recent data. We first compute
optimal hedge ratios using quadratic utility with zero
transactions costs for different values of the Coefficient of
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA). Transaction costs are
then incorporated into the cocoa exporter’s utility
maximization problem and the optimal hedge ratios are
recalculated. We then repeat the analysis with a more
realistic Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function (Nelson and Escalante, 2004). The Nelson and
Escalante (2004) utility framework allows for the more
reasonable Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA)
and Decreasing Absolute Risk Prudence (DAP)
assumptions. The Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility
function also displays risk vulnerability which is the most
natural restriction on preferences (Gollier and Pratt, 1996;
Mattos, Garcia and Nelson, 2008). A search program in
Visual Basic was developed to compute optimal hedge
ratios by solving the UMP of the cocoa exporter with
Nelson and Escalante (2004) type preferences exposed to
revenue risk and transaction costs. We find that optimal
hedge ratios are positive even when transactions costs
and production risks are incorporated into the UMP of the
Ashesi Economics Lectures Series Journal 48 Volume 1, issue 1
EconJournal1-5-v2_Layout 1  03/04/2013  10:55  Page 48
cocoa producer but they are small in magnitude. Thus,
only limited use of the futures markets is optimal for the
cocoa exporter vindicating Rolfo.
Literature review
The question of whether cocoa revenue-dependent
sovereigns should hedge export revenue risk was first
addressed by Rolfo (1980). Rolfo derived joint optimal
price and output (revenue) risk hedge ratios for the major
SSA cocoa producers: Ghana, CIV and Nigeria and found
that limited or no use of futures markets may be superior
to a full hedge. The optimal hedge ratio was computed
assuming utility maximization of the exporters’ final
wealth. 
Rolfo maximized logarithmic utility and quadratic utility
functions to develop optimal hedge ratios from the UMP.
The log utility function displays Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA), a realistic preference representation, but
does not allow the risk parameter to vary as it is fixed at
unity. The log utility assumption is thus restrictive and
unlikely to be very useful because it does not allow
analysis of how the hedge ratios change as the risk
parameter changes. 
In comparison, the quadratic utility function implies
increasing relative risk aversion (which means that risky
assets are inferior goods) and satiation (which means that
the utility starts decreasing after a satiation point). Both
are not consistent with observed behaviour (Mattos,
Nelson and Garcia, 2008; Nelson and Escalante, 2004).
However, given quadratic utility, preferences can be
represented by the mean and variance of the underlying
wealth distribution, greatly simplifying the utility
maximization problem (Rolfo, 1980). 
The simplicity of the computation of the mean-variance
hedge (MVH) derived by assuming quadratic utility
explains its popularity of use in the literature despite
inconsistency with the actual behaviour of economic
agents (Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990; Lence,
1996). Although more recent literature no longer assumes
preferences with quadratic utility due to its unrealistic
properties, the mean-variance model (that is typically
implied by quadratic utility) is still used if the underlying
utility displays CARA and returns are normally distributed.
Here, for comparison to results derived from assuming a
CARA utility function with normal returns, we employ a
CRRA utility function first defined by Nelson and
Escalante (2004) which is consistent with observed
behaviour because it displays Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA), Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
(DARA), Decreasing Absolute Risk Prudence (DAP) as
well as risk vulnerability. CRRA, DARA, DAP and risk
vulnerability are desirable characteristics of utility functions
(Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Nelson and Escalante, 2004;
Mattos, Garcia and Nelson, 2008). Since Gollier and Pratt
(1996) demonstrate convincingly that risk vulnerability is
the most natural restriction of utility functions, the Nelson
and Escalante (2004) CRRA utility function, which is risk
vulnerable, is best suited for modelling risk preferences of
agents and is employed in this research. 
Apart from unrealistic preferences (which can
undermine the accuracy of optimal hedge rations),
changes in the assumptions used to develop optimal
hedge ratios can influence their magnitude and
usefulness (Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha, 1984). In
particular, when any of the assumptions underlying the
derivation of the mean-variance hedges (MVH) which can
be derived from CARA utility changes, MV hedges
change dramatically (Lence, 1996). Although both Rolfo
(1980) and McKinnon (1967)  relax the zero production
risk assumption neither takes into account how
transaction costs, such as brokerage fees, can affect the
optimal hedge ratios. We relax both assumptions and
investigate how production risks and transaction costs
simultaneously affect the optimal hedge assuming the
cocoa exporter has realistic preferences.
Following Rolfo (1990), Sy (1990) and Outtara,
Schroeder and Sorenson (1990) also examined the costs
and benefits of hedging commodity export revenue risk in
a utility framework. Sy (1990) compared the relative costs
and benefits from hedging the revenue risks of a basket of
goods (cocoa, coffee and cotton) for CIV. Sy (1990)
focused primarily on the change in utility from hedging
price risk when production risk is introduced into the
standard price risk hedging problem. He then compared
the gains from minimizing risk using futures markets with
gains in utility from mitigating risk using stabilization
programs. In contrast to Rolfo (1980), Sy (1990) does not
define a pre-harvest to harvest hedge horizon for his
analysis. Instead, he defines an annual export price index
as the ratio of annual total export revenue to the total
export volume. He uses this annual price index (the cash)
and annual average New York Stock Exchange futures
prices from 1973 to 1984 to compute MVH ratios by
Ordinary Least Squares. 
Consistent with Rolfo’s findings, Sy (1990) concludes
the hedge ratios for mitigating cocoa price risk alone are
positive and smaller than unity. In contrast to Rolfo’s
conclusions, Sy (1990) finds that when production risk is
introduced, the sign of hedge ratios are ex ante unclear.
They can be positive or negative depending on the joint
distribution of futures prices, cash prices and production.
However the benefits from market risk management
exceed the benefits from stabilization policies so CIV will
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benefit greatly from hedging cocoa market risks. Similar
to Rolfo, Sy (1990)’s findings may be dated and not
necessarily relevant to the contemporary risk
management problem that SSA cocoa exporters face.
Further, Sy (1990) also fails to include and analyse effects
of transaction costs on the optimal hedge ratios. 
Although they analysed coffee not cocoa revenue risk,
the research by Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson (1990)
is relevant here because it uses a similar method to Rolfo
(1980) to analyse a similar problem. Outtara, Schroeder
and Sorenson (1990) investigated the possibility of
reducing the CIV coffee marketing board’s export revenue
risk by using futures markets. Following Rolfo (1980), they
develop optimal hedge ratios by maximizing a quadratic
utility function for a coffee exporter exposed to export
revenue risk. Futures prices from 1973/74 to 1986/87
were collected to generate forecast errors using the
coffee contract on the New York Sugar, Coffee and
Cocoa Exchange (SCCE). Cash prices and output
forecasts were obtained from the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The futures forecast
price is the May closing futures reported on the last day of
October, while the futures price at expiration is the May
futures reported on the first day of May. They concluded
that the CIV could reduce revenue risk by 29 percent if it
hedged 125 percent of production over the 1973/74 to
1986/87 period. Since Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson
(1990) suggest that CIV should hedge more than total
output, CIV may derive speculative profits from declining
prices over the period. However, speculation will increase
CIV’s risk making it an undesirable strategy given their risk
minimizing objective. Similar to Rolfo (1980) and Sy
(1990), Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson (1990) use a
CARA utility function. Further, like Rolfo (1980) and Sy
(1990), Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson (1990) do not
investigate the effect of transaction costs on the optimal
hedge ratio. 
Borenstein et al (2009) also investigate the UMP facing
an agricultural producer exposed to revenue risk.
However although they focused only on price but not
production risk they identified another utility-enhancing
property of hedging not previously intensely discussed in
the literature (although it had been highlighted by Malone
(2005)). Specifically, Borenstein et al (2009) used a
dynamic optimization model to estimate the welfare gains
from hedging against commodity price risk for
commodity-exporting countries. They consider a small
open economy that is exposed to shocks in the price of
the commodity that it exports. They then compare welfare
from two scenarios: a baseline no-hedging case to the
hedging case where hedging is done using futures
contracts. They find that hedging has two dimensions of
benefits: (i) it reduces income volatility and smoothens
consumption (ii) it reduces the propensity for the
sovereign to hold foreign assets as precautionary saving.
This paper focuses on the first dimension of benefits
although the benefit from the precautionary motive could
also be substantial because it implies reduced interest on
sovereign debt.
In a recent contribution, Lence (2009) also tries to
solve the UMP facing an agricultural producer such as a
cocoa exporter exposed to revenue risk. He investigates
whether atomistic producers in developing countries
should hedge revenue risk using a dynamic model that
allows for price to influence expected production. He
concludes that hedging reduces risk, increases
production and lowers price because of a downward
sloping demand function. Hedgers "win" when their
production is small but lose when their production is
large. For large hedgers, he finds hedging is sub-optimal
because it reduces their welfare. However, it is imperative
to recognize that the structure of the UMP in Lence
(2009) work is somewhat different from the problem
discussed in this paper. Here we investigate the market
activities of Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD)
which is responsible for exporting cocoa, not the
production activities of atomistic producers as in Lence
(2009). In effect, producers in Ghana do not sell to the
world market, but rather they sell to the marketing board
at a "stable price" which then will mean that there will be
no added risk-response increase in production from the
use of futures. As far as the COCOBOD is concerned,
prices will not fall and output will not increase because of
increased hedging activity since price discovery is
exogenous here. Consequently, the reduction in producer
welfare due to hedging that Lence (2009) identified will
not likely be observed here.
We contribute to the literature by re-analysing the
cocoa exporter’s revenue risk problem as originally
defined by Rolfo (1980) but in the post structural break
cocoa market. In particular, like Rolfo, we focus on the
risk minimizing property of hedging (not the precautionary
saving motive) and use a realistic utility function due to
Nelson and Escalante (2004) that exhibits decreasing
absolute risk aversion (DARA), constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), risk vulnerability and decreasing
absolute risk prudence (DAP). Like, Borenstein et al
(2009), Rolfo (1980), Sy (1990) and Lence (2009), we
determine if risk hedging is utility improving compared to
the no hedging situation when transactions costs are
zero. We then analyse the effect of transactions costs on
the optimal hedge ratio and on exporter utility. 
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Problem formulation, model 
and methods
Despite export and domestic market liberalization in the
1990’s, a substantial amount of the cocoa exported from
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is controlled by governmental
agencies and not by private agents (Dand, 1999). In
Ghana, in spite of domestic market liberalization in 1994,
the government-run Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD)
remains a monopoly exporter of Ghana cocoa (Bulir,
2002). There are several private Licensed Buying Agents
(LBAs) that can purchase the cocoa directly from the
farmers but these LBAs must resell all the cocoa to
COCOBOD at the port for export (Dand, 1999). Hence,
COCOBOD is Ghana’s sole decision maker on the
marketing and exportation of cocoa. Funds generated by
COCOBOD through its various activities are used for
consumption smoothing, and to stimulate economic
development and growth mainly through the provision of
public goods like roads and education.
Substantial production variation exists in the amount of
cocoa harvested and exported due to unexpected rainfall
patterns, diseases and pest attacks (Rolfo, 1980 and
COCOBOD, 2000). COCOBOD is therefore concerned
about how production risk can alter the effects of export
revenue risk on sovereign exporter utility. Further,
COCOBOD is also concerned about the effects of price
variability on export revenue  risk because it directly faces
the world cocoa prices which exhibit considerable price
variability influenced respectively by elastic demand and
inelastic supply (Razzaque, Osafo-Kwaako and Grynberg,
2007). 
Elevated price and production risk result in
considerable revenue risk with associated and
undesirable consequences. Here, we assume the
COCOBOD takes a pre-harvest position in the futures
market in order to guard against unexpected variation in
cocoa export revenues emanating from price or output
risk at harvest time. The main Ghanaian cocoa harvest
season commences in October and ends in January. The
hedge uses New York Board of Trade (NBYOT) futures
contracts and is assumed to be placed on the first trading
day of July (pre-harvest) and closed on the last trading
day of December (harvest). This six-month hedge horizon
was selected for analysis of the revenue risk minimization
problem using futures markets because it is most
representative of the marketing situation faced by
COCOBOD. At the decision date (pre-harvest, t = 0), the
COCOBOD can sell h commodity contracts on the
exchange each of which reflects a specific production
quantity in the futures market at price f. At harvest (t = 1),
COCOBOD can deliver the quantity of cocoa specified by
the contracts to an identified delivery point which is
unusual or can simply repurchase cocoa at the random
futures price Pf on the exchange. Cash sales are made at
the end of the hedging period, and COCOBOD will
receive that price. Conceptually, losses in the cash market
can be recouped in the futures market and vice versa. 
We acknowledge here that existing literature on
hedging production risk with futures has been criticized
by Just, Khantachavana and Just (2010) and others. In
particular the authors claim the existing literature on
production risk (i) cannot discern production risk
preferences  (ii) cannot discern the factors that relate to
production risk preference (iii) is replete with evidence that
prior estimations of production risk were incorrect and (iv)
acknowledges the failure of current models to generate
policy relevant results. In the absence of viable alternative
methods of production risk management choices,
however, hedging offers the best odds to effectively
minimize revenue risk out of the best existing methods so
we use it here.
We perform the analysis using historical rather than
expectational measures of production uncertainty.
Production forecasts which were available when Rolfo
performed his analysis have been discontinued (Gil and
Duffus), and the limited number of observations and the
presence of a structural break in production makes the
usefulness of other forecast methods (e.g., ARIMA)
limited.
Following Rolfo (1980), the formulation distinguishes
between the random actual cash prices (P) when the
hedge is lifted, and prices recorded on the futures
exchange, f and Pf. P is the stochastic cash price
received by COCOBOD and is used to reflect actual world
cocoa cash prices. Both futures contract settlement price
and the cash prices are used in computing optimal joint
price-output hedge ratios. The revenue function of the
cocoa exporter exposed to simultaneous price and
output risks in the absence of transaction costs is defined
in (1)
(1)R = PQ + h (f – P1),
Where Q is the random quantity, h is the futures position, f
is the futures price on the day the hedge is placed and Pf
is the futures settlement price recorded on the last trading
day. The returns or cocoa export revenue, R, are the sum
of the returns in the cash market, and the returns the
exporter realizes from transactions in the futures markets.
When transaction costs are incorporated, the revenue
function in (1) can be re-written as in (2),
(2)R = PQ + h (f – P1 – b ),
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b in (2) is transaction costs in the form of brokerage fees
in US dollars per ton. The utility maximization problem
(UMP) of the Ghana cocoa marketing board is modelled
first with quadratic utility then with a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function U (.) where U (.)’ > 0, U’’ <
0, and the utility function is concave. Utility is defined as a
function of export revenue (R). 
The cocoa exporter with quadratic (mean-variance)
utility function
Quadratic utility which implies mean-variance preferences
has extensive theoretical and empirical application in the
literature (Peck, 1975; Rolfo, 1980; Chavas and Pope,
1982; Kahl, 1983 and Alexander, Muser and Mason,
1986). It is popular because of its simplicity. The UMP
with quadratic utility function is given in (3) where h, the
futures position, is the choice variable in COCOBOD’s
Utility Maximization Problem.
(3)
Max: EU (μR (R (h)), σR2 (R (h)) = μR (R (h)) γδR2 (R (h)) = 
E [E [ PQ + h (f – P1 – b)] – E [PQ + h (f – P1 –b)]}2], 
and μR (R (h)) and are respectively the mean and variance
of export revenue and γ is the risk parameter (the
coefficient of relative risk aversion or CRRA). The optimal
futures position obtained by solving (3) is given in (4) 
(4)
h = covariance [PQ, Pf] | σpf2 + E [(f – P1 – b) | 2σpf2γ],
where is the variance of Pf. Note that in equations (3) and
(4), E is the mathematical expectation operator so the
expected value of stochastic cocoa exporter revenue is,
E(R) = μR (R (h)) = E [PQ + h (f – Pf – b)] and the variance
of stochastic revenue is σR2 (R (h))) = E {[PQ + h (f – P1 –
b0]}2 . For clarity of presentation, in solving for h from the
maximization of expected utility, we will left out the overall
expectation sign (E) because the utility itself is a function
of mean and variances which are also defined using the
expectation (E) sign. However the computations are done
with the correct expression of expected utility. 
The first component of h in (4) is the pure revenue
hedge, the coefficient of Pf in a linear regression where
PQ is the dependent variable and Pf is the independent
variable (Rolfo, 1980). The pure hedge is independent of
the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter. However it
does crucially depend on the sign of the correlation
between output and the futures price at expiration with a
positive correlation supportive of a hedge (Alexander,
Muser and Mason, 1986). The second term is the bias in
futures price (Rolfo, 1980) less transaction costs. This
bias (also called the speculative part of the hedge) is
included for completeness but may be zero if risk aversion
is extremely high or if the market is efficient. If this bias
(the speculative component) is non-zero its magnitude
depends on the risk aversion parameter. When
transaction costs are zero, (4) is identical to Rolfo (1980)’s
derivations. 
Cocoa exporter with Nelson Escalante (2004) 
utility function
Nelson and Escalante (2004) demonstrated that when the
joint distribution of cash and futures returns are elliptically
symmetric and final wealth satisfies the location-scale
condition, expected utility can be written as a function of
the first two moments of the return distribution
(Chamberlain, 1983; and Meyer, 1987). We verified that
final wealth satisfied the location-scale condition in the
objective function developed using Nelson and
Escalante’s (2004) utility function. We used the Jacque-
Bera test to ensure normality of returns as normality is an
accepted form of elliptical symmetry. We thus maximize
the expected utility of the Nelson and Escalante CRRA
location-scale utility function as in (5)
(5) 
Max: EU (μR (R (h)), σR2 (R (h))) = –1| (μR (R (h)}2 – γ (R (h))). 
To maximizing (5), we simply maximize its denominator
since both operations give the same answer. To identify h
as the explicit choice variable, we re-write (5) as an
explicit function of h and then maximize the denominator
of the resulting function where h is the choice variable (6).
(6)
Max: (μR (R (h))2 – γσR2 (R (h))) =
(E [(R (h))2 – γE [(R (h – Pf – b)]}2 =
E [PQ + h (P1 – f – b)]
2 – γE [PQ – hb]]2.
Let σR2 be defined as in (7)
(7)
σR2 (h))) = E[R (h) – E(R (h))]2 = 
E [PQ – h (Pf – f – b)] – E [PQ – hb]]
2,
We can then solve the utility function in (8) for h, the
optimal hedge position.
(8)
Max E [PQ + h (Pf – f – b)]
2 – γE {[PQ + h (Pf – f – b) –
E [PQ + h (Pf – f – b)]}2.
A closed form solution to (8) can be obtained as long as
we assume a zero basis (i.e., assuming Pf = P) and is
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included in the appendix. When we allow for non-zero
basis, a more realistic case, a closed form solution is
difficult to obtain but a search procedure similar to that
employed by Rolfo (1980) and described in the next
section can be developed to determine h, the optimal
futures position and H, the optimal hedge ratio. 
The optimal hedge ratio when basis risk is present
In the presence of basis risk (Pf ≠ P), a search program
was written in Visual Basic to solve for optimal hedge
ratios. The search program uses the following algorithm:
First set transaction costs, b = 0. For each pre-
determined level of the hedge ratio (H = h / μQ) between
0 and 1 in steps of 0.01, obtain the value of the utility
function for the twenty-eight observations from t = 1
(1980) to t = 28 (2008). Next sum the twenty-eight values
and divide by twenty-eight to get the expected value of
the utility function over the period for that value of H.
Repeat the calculations for each value of H from 0.01…
1.0. The value of H between 0 and 1 (0.01, 0.02…1.0)
that corresponds to the highest expected value of the utility
function over the period is the optimal hedge ratio. By
repeating the search over the range of H values the optimal
hedge can be found for different risk parameter values. 
To identify the effects of transaction costs, b is
included and changed and the process is repeated. The
optimal hedge ratio corresponding to each level of
transactions costs can then be compared to the optimal
hedge ratios when b = 0 and those obtained from the
MVH to determine how robust optimal joint hedge ratios
are to changes in transaction costs and to preference
type. For each pair of values of H and b, the expected
utility can be computed and compared respectively to the
expected utility where H = 0 and when both H and b have
zero values. This enables a comparison of the utilities of a
hedged and unhedged exporter given the presence or
absence of transaction costs.
Description of the data 
Transaction costs 
Transactions costs are modelled as brokerage fees
because the brokerage fee is the most important
component of transaction costs. Six levels of brokerage
fees in $/ton: 0, 10, 50, 100, 200, and 500 were selected.
Note that each cocoa futures contract contains 10 tons of
cocoa beans (the standard contract). Transaction costs
can include a number of factors including information
costs, monitoring costs, and actual monetary costs of
trading related to brokerage fees. Here we examine fees
from 0 to 500 $/ton. The likely range of brokerage fees
that COCOBOD will face is between $0 and $100.
However transactions costs incorporate huge start up
fixed costs and other financial requirements which when
spread over the total number of contracts purchased will
increase the transactions cost per contract significantly.
For example, there are costs associated with training the
risk managers at the marketing board to use the futures
market. Alternatively a foreign risk management firm could
be contracted but either option is expensive. We therefore
use $500 per contract as the cut off point for transactions
costs. 
Brokerage fees have been declining over the years and
can normally be negotiated downward for large volume
futures participants such as the COCOBOD. Brokerage
fees vary depending on whether the hedge is large or
small or whether the hedger wants full service or a per
round term transaction. A very large prospective hedger
such as the COCOBOD can obtain between 25 and 60
dollars per ton. Smaller hedgers will pay substantially
more in brokerage fees per ton so the levels of brokerage
fees we chose make sense. 
Cash, futures and futures at expiration data
The data used in the analysis were limited to the 1980–
2008 periods to avoid a structural break in 1978 in world
cocoa prices caused mainly by the policies of the
Ghanaian government. Hedge horizons were chosen so
that December is the harvest month which coincides with
October–January, the main cocoa harvest season in
Ghana (COCOBOD, 2000). Cocoa futures and output
data from 1980–2008 were obtained respectively from the
New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) and the Ghana cocoa
marketing board (COCOBOD). The NYBOT was used
because it is liquid and because the cocoa contract
traded has specifications that are compatible with the
cocoa SSA countries export although almost no Ghana
cocoa sells in NY. In order to keep our discussion and
focused, we will explain why little Ghana cocoa trades in
NY later in the paper.
Table 2 contains summary statistics for cocoa
production and revenue for Ghana as well as for the
futures and spot prices used in the research. Based on
standard deviations of prices, revenue and production
(assumed to reflect exports since in-country storage is
minimal) it is evident that there is substantial price,
production and revenue risk. Further, the mean of spot
prices (1775.4) is bigger than that of the futures price
(1514.2) which might be indicative of a bias in futures
forecasts. The mean of the futures price at expiration
(1553.2) is also greater than the futures price implying that
the optimal hedge is an increasing function of the risk
parameter (Outtara, Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990). 
The basis at contract expiration is unusually large
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($222 is about 12.5 percent of the spot price). This
positive and large number is problematic because it
implies a hedger may lock in a loss which cannot be
compensated for by any gains in variance reduction
through hedging. Typically, if the futures market is efficient
such a basis should be greatly reduced by arbitrage
activities. Empirical evidence suggests that the futures
market can be inefficient in the short run due to
informational inefficiency (McKenzie and Holt, 2002). This
means arbitrage is not always effective in reducing the
basis in the cocoa futures market. Further if prices are
properly measured and the markets are efficient in an
operational sense, the cash price in should Ghana be less
than the cash price at the delivery point (NY or London)
by the transportation costs to the delivery point. However
it is possible that because we use an average price
throughout the harvest period that the specific
transportation cost differences are masked. In particular,
large quality differentials can also mask the transportation
costs. The issue of the basis will be taken up in the
discussion section of the paper when we discuss why no
Ghana cocoa trades in NY.
Note that the standard deviation of futures prices is
smaller than that for spot prices, a favourable occurrence
for very risk-averse agents and very volatile markets such
as the cocoa market. This is because when the futures
are less risky than the cash price, risk management using
futures contracts is typically more effective. Table 3
contains results of correlation and covariance between
the futures price, the futures price at expiration and the
random spot price. It is clear that the futures at expiration
are strongly correlated with the spot price. Correlation
between all prices is high ranging from 0.9 to 1. 
Before transactions were introduced into the model
and in a bid to establish credibility of the researcher-
written computer program used to solve the UMP of the
COCOBOD, the visual basic program was first used to
solve the hedger’s UMP with quadratic preferences and
then used to replicate Rolfo's result using Rolfo's own
data. After ensuring that results were close to each other
the computer program was used to calculate hedge
ratios using recent data in the relevant range (1980–2008)
and quadratic utility. Finally the model was used to solve
the UMP using CRRA utility and the relevant data. The
computations were first carried out with only the revenue
data detrended. However the trend seems to have a
negligible effect because when the calculations was also
repeated with the revenue and futures cash both
detrended there were no discernible changes in the
results. The exercised helped to emphasize that Rolfo’s
formulation which was followed in this paper is accurate
and appropriate and our computer program worked.
Results
The pure price hedge (minimum variance hedge),
computed at infinite risk aversion, zero production risk
and zero transaction costs or from the regression of cash
on futures is 0.82 as shown in Table 4. This means, faced
with just price risk, a typical cocoa exporter like Ghana
should hedge 82 % of output in order to enjoy a level
utility from export revenue greater than the unhedged
position (zero hedge). Table 4 also displays optimal
“revenue hedge ratios” for Ghana using quadratic utility
for values of the risk parameter γ between 0.000000001
and ∞ which represent the range from a risk loving to an
extremely risk averse cocoa exporter. An identical range
was used by Rolfo (1980) so results using this range of γ
make for an interesting comparison with his work. Note
that to obtain equivalent values of ψ, the Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) for the quadratic utility, γ
(the coefficient of relative risk aversion) must be divided by
the mean of export revenue. 
When γ = ∞, the second term drops out in equation (4)
and we get the pure revenue hedge (Rolfo, 1980; Outtara,
Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990). The pure revenue hedge
(with infinite risk aversion), for quadratic utility, which can
equivalently be computed using the regression of revenue
on futures price for Ghana, assuming zero transactions
costs is 0.44 as shown in Table 4. Further, for all levels of
γ larger than 0.001, the revenue hedge is also 0.44. In
comparison, Rolfo (1980) finds using quadratic utility that
the optimal revenue hedge ratios for Ghana, is 0.6 for γ
larger than 0.001 so our results are only slightly different
from Rolfo’s. 
Since we are using data after the 1980 structural
break, the market we analyse is in theory, fundamentally
different from what Rolfo (1980) analysed. Therefore we
expect to find similar but not identical results as Rolfo
(1980) when we use the quadratic utility function. From
Table 4, the optimal hedge ratios do not vary much with γ
but similar to the results of Rolfo and Outtara, Schroeder
and Sorenson (1990), they drop precipitously after a cut
of value or γ. Here the threshold value of γ is 0.0001. The
conclusion from the analysis using quadratic utility and
zero transactions costs is that Ghana would benefit from
hedging cocoa export revenue albeit to a limited extent.
The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board should only hedge a
part of output. 
When transactions costs are incorporated into the
UMP for a typical SSA cocoa exporter such as Ghana
facing concurrent price and production risks, optimal
hedge ratios decline. Transactions costs alter optimal
hedge ratios at a γ or CRRA of 4 corresponding to a
CARA of 0.000005 using quadratic utility. From Table 5,
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between $0 and $10 dollars per contract, the optimal
hedge ratio shrinks from 0.44 to 0.38. This represents a 
6 percentage point decline in the optimal hedge ratio. At
any value of the transactions cost greater than $10, the
optimal hedge ratio is negative meaning a long hedge is
superior to a short hedge. A negative (long) hedge ratio
means that the cocoa marketing board should go long
both the commodity and the futures contract. That is,
COCOBOD should execute a reverse hedge (Rolfo,
1980). However, reverse hedging is impractical here since
it increases risk. Technically, a long hedge is a hedge used
by buyers of a product where they buy the futures in
anticipation of subsequent cash purchases. In this way,
they protect themselves against price increases in the
cash market because as long as futures and cash move
up together they can resell the futures at a higher price
and offset the loss in the cash market with a gain in the
futures market. COCOBOD is a seller not a buyer of
cocoa so it is seeking protection from price declines not
price increases so the long hedge is not favoured here. In
fact price appreciation is favourable to COCOBOD since it
increases COCOBOD’s utility. 
When we compute optimal hedge ratios with the more
realistic CRRA utility function (Nelson and Escalante,
2004), the results are different from the quadratic utility.
From Table 6, the pure revenue hedge ratio (infinite risk
aversion) for Ghana, computed at zero transactions costs
using the more representative Nelson and Escalante
(2004) utility function is 0.31. This is comparable to the
finding of Rolfo for log utility (which is also a CRRA utility
function but has a fixed CRRA γ value of 1). Rolfo finds
that Ghana should hedge 0.15 of its export volume. The
fact that the CRRA utility functions (Nelson and Escalante)
display smaller hedge ratios than the quadratic utility is to
be expected because the former also displays decreasing
absolute risk prudence which means it is less sensitive to
risk (Chen, X., H. H. Wang and R. C. Mittelhammer,
2006). Insensitivity to risk implies that as revenues
increase COCOBOD is unlikely to seek more protection
from risk because its preferences are not sensitive to risk.
An agent with quadratic utility is more sensitive to risk as
revenues increase and will seek more protection from risk
leading him to choose a higher optimal hedge ratio. 
The optimal hedge ratios using CRRA utility are fairly
constant at different values of the risk parameter (γ). From
Table 6, the optimal hedge ratio for Ghana remains
constant at 0.31 at CRRA risk parameter value (γ) greater
than 0.0000001, then turns negative. The constant
optimal hedge ratio for values for the range of γ between
infinity and 0.0000001 indicates that the speculative
component of the hedge is inconsequential. For the range
of γ greater than 0.0000001 or for risk lovers, the
speculative part of the hedge dominates so the hedger is
net long (Outarra, Schroeder and Sorenson, 1990). A long
hedge here implies speculation which is not desirable
here given the risk minimization objective outlined in
COCOBOD’s UMP.
Similar to the results of the quadratic utility analysis, the
optimal hedge declines monotonically at risk parameter
value (γ) of 4 for fairly reasonable values of transactions
cost ($0 to $100 per ton). For Ghana, transactions costs
appear to exert considerable influence on optimal hedge
ratios using the Nelson and Escalante (2004) utility
function although the transaction cost effect is less
dramatic than in the quadratic utility case.
From Table 7, between $0 and $100 dollars per
contract, which represents the feasible range of
transactions costs for a large hedger such as Ghana, the
hedge ratio declines from a value of 0.31 (the pure
revenue hedge) to 0.2. This represents an 11 percentage
point decline in the optimal hedge ratio. Figure 3
graphically illustrates the point that Table 7 makes albeit
with slight differences. From Fig 3, any value of the
transaction cost above $350 per contract results in a
negative hedge ratio or a long hedge. A long hedge
indicates a speculative position which does not make
sense for COCOBOD whose primary focus is to minimize
not increase risk.
Transaction costs have many components not all of
which has been accounted for by brokerage fees. In
particular for a SSA country such as Ghana, there is large
hidden costs such as the cost of educating the will-be
risk managers at the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board
about futures markets and contracts as well as other
financial requirements for using future contracts all of
which will increase the relevant feasible range of
transactions contracts. In other words, there will be a
fixed cost which will decline as the number of contracts
purchased decreases in addition to the variable cost per
contract. Still it is unlikely that the transactions costs paid
per contract will be as high as $350. The results using
Nelson and Escalante’s (2004) utility suggest optimal
hedge ratios for the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board
remain positive even after transactions costs are
considered. Therefore, from the results of the Nelson and
Escalante (2004) utility, limited use of the futures market
appears to be optimal for Ghana even when we take
transaction costs into account given reasonable values of
the risk parameter.
The result obtained from using the Nelson and
Escalante (2004) utility function, that revenue hedging with
futures markets is utility improving, albeit to a very small
degree,  for the cocoa exporter, is in contrast to the
conclusions from the quadratic utility analysis and from
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Rolfo’s (1980) recommendation but is consistent with the
result obtained by Borenstein, Jeane and Sandri (2009),
who compare the benefits of precautionary savings to the
benefits from hedging for export-revenue dependent
countries. Our results using the Nelson and Escalante
(2004) utility is also consistent with the results of Sy
(1990), who assesses the possibility of hedging cocoa
revenue risk for CIV. 
Lence (2009) also tries to solve the revenue risk
problem for a producer. He finds the opposite result to
this paper’s NE 2004 analysis most probably because he
endogenizes the production decision. He investigates
whether atomistic producers in developing countries
should hedge revenue risk using a dynamic model that
allows for price to influence expected production. He
concludes, in contrast to this paper, that hedging reduces
welfare because although it reduces risk, it increases
production and lowers price because of a downward
sloping demand function. However, Lence’s (2009)
measure of hedging benefit to hedgers is a little narrow as
it does not include the enhanced reputation from a
constant stream of export revenue that enables
commodity sovereign exporters to enjoy low interest rates
on loans. Borenstein, Jeane and Sandri (2009) find
substantial exporter utility gains due to hedging because
of the enhanced credit reputation typically associated with
sovereign exporters who hedge their revenues. By
contrast, because the interest rates on the international
market are prohibitive, countries that are dependent on
export revenue but do not manage revenue risk often
have little alternatives other than to settle for International
Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with low interest rates but
imposed stringent conditions that are detrimental to
borrower welfare. For example, the Ghanaian government
settled for an IMF loan in 2009 because internationally
available loans had very high interest rates. The IMF
condition for the loan was a freeze in government hiring.
When armed robbery in Ghana escalated, the
government was bound by a contract with IMF not to
increase the police force to meet the challenge of rising
crimes and murders. This chain of events could have
been prevented if Ghana managed its export risk,
reduced probability of default on loans and acquired a
healthy credit to be able to enjoy low interest rates from
international lenders.
From the result of the more representative Nelson and
Escalante (2004) utility function used in this research,
Ghana should hedge considerably less than full output
when facing pure price risk. When faced with revenue
risk, Ghana should hedge significantly less than it hedged
when facing pure price risk for values of the CRRA risk
parameter between 1 and 5. When transactions costs are
considered, the typical SSA cocoa exporter will choose to
hedge a very miniscule portion of his output. This result
partly validates Rolfo’s (1980)’s conclusions that a
minimum use of the futures market or none at all is
superior to a full hedge. This is because even though
optimal hedge ratio is positive it is very small. The data
used in this research spans 1980–2008 and Rolfo used
1956–1976 data and we have evidence of a structural
break in 1978 so we did not expect Rolfo’s result to be
necessarily relevant to the UMP facing an SSA cocoa
exporter today. However, the evidence suggests that
Rolfo’s conclusions remain relevant, at least in part, today. 
Limitations of the research 
The research suffered from a lack of access to data. In
particular, the Gil and Duffus cocoa output forecasts
which were originally used by Rolfo (1980) in his analysis
were unavailable because they had been discontinued
over two decades ago. Consequently, it was impossible
to extend Rolfo’s work using his own methods to the
relevant date range of this research using data from an
identical source. The result from such an analysis (if it had
been done) could tell us how drastic an effect the
changes in the cocoa sector have had on the UMP of
Ghana as a cocoa producer and on corresponding
optimal hedge ratios that minimize export revenue risk.
Given that there was some difference in utility functions
used by Rolfo and the current authors the result of the
analysis described above will make for useful comparison
to the research results obtained here  in order to
demonstrate the importance of getting the utility function
right. Further, there still remains some ambiguity in the
literature about the relevant values of the risk parameter.
The results of the research are limited to an extent
therefore by the accuracy of the second best solution of
predicating our measure of CRRA on literature values
instead of directly estimating it. Lastly the definition of
utility as used here is narrow and should be generalized to
reflect risk reduction from a smoothened income stream
when export revenues are hedged.
Discussion of unusual results
Pertinent questions that still persist after careful
interpretation of the descriptive statistics presented in
Table 2 and include (i) why COCOBOD should consider
hedging cocoa revenue risk a viable option in the first
place given the large difference between cash and futures
($222/ton) (ii) from where does this large basis emerge
and (iii) how should it be treated in the analysis and why
does arbitrage not eliminate this basis? 
To answer question (ii) first, the basis ($222/ton) is
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primarily due to quality premiums paid to West African
cocoa farmers and to Ghanaian cocoa farmers in
particular because Ghana cocoa is the most quality
cocoa. More specifically, the NYBOT offers quality
premiums of $160/ton for West African cocoa but does
not differentiate among the different types of West Africa
cocoa (Ghana, CIV, Togo and Benin). Further for historical
reasons, the NBOT does not receive much Ghana cocoa
so does not offer a premium for Ghana cocoa. Gilbert
(2009) suggests that Ghanaian cocoa draws a premium
of 3 to 5 percent relative to CIV cocoa. Using data for this
research as a rough guide, the mean cash price of cocoa
(1980–2008) was about $1775 so the following three
scenario is plausible: If we assume a middle value of 4 per
cent as the price Ghana receives for its cocoa as
premium relative to CIV then that amounts to about $71.
If we add this to the West African premium of $160, we
arrive at about $231 which is not much different from
$222/ton differential between the FOB price in Ghana and
the NYBOT futures price in NY. A report jointly prepared
by the University of Ghana (UG) and the Institute of
Developments Studies (IDS) also found that Ghana cocoa
commands premium of up to US$200–250 per tonne
over the prevailing international cocoa price. To answer
question (iii) a reasonable thing to do will be to add the
$231/ton quality premium to all the futures prices before
using the futures data to calculate hedge ratios. Such an
exercise is a useful exercise for further research. With
regards to why arbitrage has not succeeded in eroding
the basis, recall that since the cocoa revenue data used in
the simulation data was obtained from COCOBOD while
the futures data is from the NYBOT, the cash and futures
data have a spatial difference so a strategy where traders
go long the futures, stand for delivery, and then
turnaround and sell on the spot market is not feasible. In
fact, the large basis is due to quality differentials that
cannot be arbitraged away. To further explain the quality
differential, recall that Ghana cocoa is the world’s most
quality cocoa and enjoys a significant premium although
no Ghana cocoa is sold on the NYBOT at the moment. In
contrast, most of the cocoa sold in the NYBOT comes
from South America. Some of the difference in basis may
be explained by quality differentials because the cash
price (P) in the revenue stream is based on actual cash
prices received by COCOBOD but the futures at
expiration that is defined in the export revenue stream are
prices recorded by the NYBOT in New York. These later
prices may be more heavily influenced by the average
price of less quality non-Ghanaian e.g. (CIV and South
American) cocoa since apart from SSA, South America
dominates the NYBOT market. The failure of successful
arbitrage to reduce the basis may also be due to
insufficient liquidity in the market to support this
speculation. 
Finally to answer question (ii) or why COCOBOD
should even consider hedging cocoa revenue risk in the
first place when it is fully aware of the significant basis
between cash and futures, it seems plausible to argue
that since the quality differential is so big for Ghana
cocoa, the COCOBOD may have ex ante has little reason
to hedge if he is in fact performing a ‘selective’ hedging
strategy where the decision to hedge is based on a
“market view.” It is also plausible, however, that the
COCOBOD is concerned about placing an effective
hedge should it decide to hedge because it is primarily
concerned with risk. In this scenario, hedging is relevant
and the effectiveness of the hedge (typically capture by
the R-square in a regression of cash on futures) is high if
the cash is closely related to the futures, depending on
the degree of risk aversion. The more risk averse the
hedger, the more effective the hedge.
COCOBOD may choose to hedge on the NYBOT
instead of say LIFFE because the NYBOT is more liquid
with much larger volumes traded leading to significant
reduction in transaction costs. Cocoa prices are
controlled by both demand and supply side factors.
Specifically weak supply and strong demand drives prices
up and the converse is true. At the moment cocoa prices
are high on the back of subdued supply as CIV the
world’s largest cocoa supplier has cut back on exports. It
is likely that CIV will ramp up exports in the future which
pose a downward risk to prices through sustained and
increased supply. Further though cocoa demand is fairly
inelastic so that the industry has not been affected by low
demand due to the global financial crisis, an extended
sluggish recovery may pull demand back. This will further
dampen prices. If the COCOBOD has real reasons to
suspect a price decline then the hedging problem as
defined here makes sense and an effective hedge will
increase the COCOBOD’s utility by averting the risk of
cocoa revenue declines. Recall that for risk-averse
producers with preferences defined like those in this
problem, a reduction in the variability of the mean
dominates the utility function (Adam, Garcia and Hauser,
1996). This means they may value risk minimization
enough to forego the opportunity to make money. This is
because the margins and transaction costs locked up in
hedging activity could be earning interest at market rates.
To calculate just how much money they can forego by
hedging we can compute the "opportunity cost of
hedging" following Mattos, Garcia and Nelson (2008).
However it does seem that the size of the quality premium
may be too big for its contribution to the hedger's utility to
be overcome by gains from risk minimization unless the
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hedger only cares about reducing risk in which instance, a
case is made for the relevance of hedging cocoa revenue
risk. However since find such low numbers for the
revenue hedges we conclude that hedging even if it
applies offers little over COCOBOD’s current practice of
forward-contracting. Rolfo was right.
Conclusion and suggestions for
further research
SSA cocoa producers such as Ghana are typically
exposed to both production and price risk which results in
revenue risk. Revenue risk can be managed using futures
contracts. However, the use of futures markets
incorporates costs that may take away from the benefits.
This analysis which investigated the effect of transaction
costs and risk tolerance on the optimal hedge was carried
out using cocoa revenue data from Ghana, a major SSA
cocoa producer and respectively, quadratic utility and
Nelson and Escalante’s (2004) CRRA utility functions. We
confirm Rolfo’s result that the optimal hedge is increasing
in the risk parameter for both utility functions for the range
of data used. However, using quadratic utility, we find that
for reasonable values of the risk parameter, and positive
transaction costs we obtain very small positive hedge
ratios or negative hedge ratios which imply that the cocoa
exporter should hedge a miniscule portion of total export
or not at all which is consistent with Rolfo (1980).
By contrast using the Nelson and Escalante (2004)
utility function which is a more believable representation of
preferences, optimal hedge ratios remain positive even
after transactions costs are considered. Since the optimal
hedge ratio is the solution of a utility maximization
problem, the exporter can only do as well or better than
not hedging. This means that for Ghana, limited use of
the futures market is utility improving. This partly also
confirms Rolfo results. The conclusion from this study is
that from a utility perspective, limited use of the futures
market for hedging revenue or not at all risk will benefit
Ghana. However, given the unexplained positive and large
quality differential between cash and futures which means
the COCOBOD may lock in a loss in attempting to
minimize risk, COCOBOD should keep forward
contacting
Suggestions for further results
Although this paper does not focus on the enhanced
reputation dimension of the benefits of hedging revenue
risk, following Malone (2005), it will be interesting to
simulate the reduction in the probability of sovereign
default risk that a smoothened cocoa export revenue risk
from hedging entails. The reduction in cost of sovereign
borrowing from different degrees of income smoothing
due to hedging should also provide valuable information
to policy-makers.
More detailed analysis of the effect of transportation
costs on the optimal hedge ratios and on the utility from
hedging revenue risk will also provide pertinent
information for Ghanaian policy makers. Incorporation of
the utility derived from reduced borrowing rates and
decreased probability of sovereign default on loans (that
hedging entails) into the utility maximization problem of
the cocoa-exporting SSA sovereign are also useful
candidates for further research. 
Further research must also investigate if the structure
of domestic cocoa marketing in Ghana is likely to change
from a focus on production exclusively for export to a
focus on processing the produced cocoa and whether
that change will reduce risks for COCOBOD making risk
management less of an issue and hedging of little value.
In particular, as Prebisch and Singer (1954) have argued,
terms of trade decline over time for primary products like
cocoa so it might be a good idea for the producers of
primary products to move up the chain into processing. It
could plausibly be argued that since comparative
advantage is dynamic not static, by investing into
technology, Ghana might actually secure a comparative
advantage in processing cocoa over time which can help
it process more cocoa beans. If Ghana substantially
increases the proportion of cocoa beans processed
domestically then hedging against variation in the process
of cocoa beans becomes less relevant because cocoa
input acquisition will be assured and the price will be pre-
determined by forward contracts. 
The move into processing critically depends on
whether the value added per tonne of processing more
than compensates for the lost premiums per tonne selling
raw cocoa beans. Ghana enjoys quality premiums from
selling the beans because Ghana cocoa is the most
quality cocoa. It is the industry standard in terms of
quality. Cocoa from all other countries is discounted to
Ghana cocoa. Preliminary research by Pinnamang Tutu
and Armah (2011), suggests that the value added from
processing seems to be increasing over time and in turn,
the tonnage processed by Ghana is inching up. However
at the moment almost all the main crop cocoa (80% of
total production) is still wholly exported. Research that
identifies what combination of total beans produced
should be exported and what percentage should be
processed in Ghana will not only determine the value of
hedging revenue risk (since hedging is less useful to
processors) but will also be valuable information for
Ghanaian cocoa policy makers seeking to maximize
sovereign welfare from cocoa export revenue.
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Figure 1 Cash and futures cocoa prices, 1960–2008
Figure 2 Futures price variations, 1960–2008
Figure 3 OHR at different transaction costs, = 4 and
using  NE 2004 utility 
Data Source: Export Revenue data was obtained from the
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board
Ho: The Ratio of the variances from the two periods is
unity
Ha: Ratio of the variances from the two periods is not
unity
m = # of observations before the break.
n = # of observations after the break.
MI: Miller jackknife test for differences in variance between
two periods.
For large m and n, Q converges to a standard normal
distribution. High Q-Stat is strong evidence of a structural
break.
Variance and covariances are in parentheses
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Table 1 Structural break test for the variance of
cocoa futures price
Structural
break m n Q-stat P-value
Standard deviation July
of the futures price 1978 18 30 -5.0 < 0.001
Table 2 Summary statistics for annual production
and revenue Ghana, 1980–2008
Production (*100 tonnes) Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Ghana 493.37 69.79 360.05 653.32
Random revenue 
(*$1000) Ghana 885640.8 281240.4 353567.6 1301258
Prices ($) Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Cash 1775.37 453.72 890 2690
Futures at expiration 1553.22 441 877 2469
Futures forecast 1514.22 440.36 692 2513
Table 3 Correlations between cash and futures
prices, 1980–2008




Cash price 0.86 1
(171581) (205861) 1
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Table 4 Optimal hedge ratios at different values of
risk parameter for quadratic utility for Ghana as an
cocoa exporter


















Pure Revenue Hedge 0.44
Table 5 Comparisons of optimal hedge ratios (MVH)
for Ghana at a value of the risk parameter (γ) of 4
and at different transactions costs using quadratic
utility








Table 6 Optimal hedge ratios at different values of
CRRA for Nelson and Escalante utility function for
different values of the CRRA risk parameter for
Ghana


















Pure Revenue Hedge 0.31
Table 7 Comparisons of optimal hedge ratios for the
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board at a CRRA rist
parameter value (γ) of 4 and at different transactions
costs (B)
Ghana Data, NE 2004 utility and Risk parameter 
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Appendix 1
The closed-form optimal solution for the optimal
hedge when basis risk is absent
Here P= Pf so we can use that information to solve the
utility function in (A.1) for h, the optimal hedge position.
A.1  
Max
E (PQ + h (Pf – f – b)]2 – γE {[PQ + h (Pf – f – b) –
E (PQ + h (Pf – f – b)]
2
A closed form solution to (8) can be obtained if we
assume no basis risk (i.e., assuming Pf = P) and is
included in the appendix. When we allow for basis risk a
closed form solution is difficult to obtain but a search
procedure similar to that employed by Rolfo (1980) can
be developed to determine h and by implication the
optimal hedge ratio. The search procedure is discussed in
more detail in the text and is the procedure used to
generate our results because it is more practical to
assume non-zero basis risk. Assuming no basis risk so
that Pf = P, we can expand the last term in (A.1) to get
(A.2 )
(A.12)
E [PQ – h (Pf – f – b) – E [PQ – hb]]
2 = σR2 (R (h))
= E (P2Q2) – [PQ]2 – 2hE (PQ (P – f) + h2E (P – f)2.
Let h2E (P – f)2 = σpf2 so we have (A.3),
A.3  
σR2 (R (h))) = E (P2Q2) – [PQ]2 – 2hE (PQ (P – f) + h2σpf2.
To solve for h we need only consider terms that contain h
in (A.3). Expanding the last two terms in (A.3) by adding
and subtracting f and μQ, we obtain A.4 
A.4 
σR2 (R (h)) = h2σpf2 – 2hE ({P – f + f} {Q – μQ + μQ}
(P – f)), where μQ is the mean of output. Simplifying this
expression, we arrive ate (A.5)
A.5  
σR2 (R (h)) = h2σpf2 – 2hE ({P – f}2 {Q– μQ}) + 2hfE ({P –
f} {Q – μQ}).
Let E({P-f} {Q-μQ}) = covariance (P,Q) = ρ σpf σQ where
ρ is the correlation coefficient between P and Q, and σpf
and σQ are respectively the standard deviation of P (= Pf)
and Q. So now we have A.6 
A.6   
σR2 (R (h)) = h2σpf2 – 2hE ({P – f}2 {Q– μQ}) – 2hμQσpf2 
– 2hfρσpfσQ
The maximization problem now becomes 
A.7 
Max E [PQ + h ( Pf – f – b)]2 – γ (E {[h2σpf2 – 2hE [(P – f)2
{Q – μQ} – 2hμQ. 
The futures position, h, is the solution of the optimization
problem in (A.7) and is given by (A.8):
A.8  
h = [2 γ E({P-f}2 {Q-μQ})] / [2 γ σpf2 – 2b2] + [2 γ f ρ σQ
+ μQ 2] / [2γσpf2 – 2b] – [2bE(PQ)] / [2 γ σpf2 – 2b]. 
Assuming normality, the third and fourth moments of the
distribution of price, revenue and quantity are all zero so h
is given by
A.9    
h = [2 γ f ρ σpf σQ + μQ σpf2] / [2 γ σpf2 – 2b] – [2b E
(PQ)] / [2 γ σpf2 – 2b]. 
Given normality, and in the absence of transactions costs,
b = 0 and we get
A.10  
h =  [f ρ σQ / σpf ] + μQ.
The hedge ratio H = h / μQ so from (A.10), we get (A.11)
A.11   
H = ρ (f / σpf) (σQ / μQ) + 1. 
Therefore if ρ is negative, both the correlation between Q
and P and transactions costs (b) will tend to reduce the
optimal hedge ratio. Note that equation (A.11) has a very
intuitive interpretation because (f / σpf) is the inverse of
the coefficient of variation of futures price at expiration
and (σQ / μQ) is the coefficient of variation of stochastic
output (Mackinnon, 1967). Clearly if  ρ < 0 so that price
and production are negatively related, then the optimal
hedge ratio is less than unity. This result is similar to the
conclusions drawn by Mackinnon (1967) and Rolfo
(1980): in the presence of production risk and no
transactions costs the optimal hedge ratio is less than
unity. The more negatively correlated are price and output,
the smaller the optimal hedge ratio. If in addition, price
and production are not correlated then we get
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A.12  
ρ = 0 and H = 1 in an unbiased futures market. 
The cocoa exporter should fully hedge output. The result
H = 1 is the usual case described by Hieronymus (1971)
for a merchant faced only with price risk and has support
in the literature (see Ederington, 1971; Rolfo, 1980 and
McKinnon, 1967). If transactions costs are not zero then
we get (A.13)
A.13  
H  =  [2 γ f ρ σpf σQ + μQ σpf] / [2 γ σpf2 –2b] μQ –
[2bE (PQ)] / μQ [2 γ σpf2 – 2b]. 
Appendix 2







LBC: Licensed Buying Agent
SPU: Seed Production Unit
CRIG: Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana
CCVDCU: Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease Control Unit
CMC: Cocoa Marketing Company
Source: Pinnamang-Tutu (2010)
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Cocoa bean production (smallholder

































ii A recent related problem pertinent to export price risk
emanates out of the uncertainty associated with variations
in import price since most developing countries now
import majority of the food they consume. See Sarris,
Conforti and Prakesh (2011) for an excellent theoretical
and empirical treatment of import price risk.
ii See Appendix 2 at the end of this paper and Pinnamang-
Tutu (2010) for more details on the institutional
organization of the cocoa industry in Ghana.
iii This hedge horizon is convenient because the cocoa
futures market (NYBOT) has five contract months in a
year: March, May, July, September and December.
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